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Ratification and Reliability: The Strategic Logic of Formal Treaties 
 
Benjamin L. Kenzer 
 
Abstract 
 
This thesis evaluates the connection between ratification and alliance structure, formation, and 
reliability. It hypothesizes that as ratification requirements become more rigorous, alliance 
formation becomes less likely and alliance structures become more likely. In the mean time, 
ratified alliances will be more reliable. This thesis tests these theories using both qualitative and 
quantitative evidence. Applying three case studies on the League of Nations, it illustrates how the 
increased rigor of ratification rules makes alliance formation more difficult. Meanwhile, member-
level data from the Alliance Treaties and Obligations dataset between 1815 and 2000 suggests 
that ratification makes alliances more reliable. Overall, then, ratification does seem to have an 
impact on alliance politics.  
 
 
 
 In “The President and International Commitments: Treaties as Signaling Devices,” 
Lisa Martin posits that presidents use formal military treaties as a signaling device. This 
device conveys to foreign leaders both the seriousness and reliability of security 
commitments, as the President invests in bearing “the costs of undergoing the formal… 
treaty procedure.” In the SALT II negotiations, for example, the Soviet foreign minister 
insisted the treaty be ratified, lest it attain “inferior status.”1 
 Such strategic thinking raises numerous questions. Does the signal Martin describes, 
reflecting expectations of state behavior, actually play out as predicted in international 
relations? How important is the formal-informal distinction in alliance formation? This 
                                                        
For input on the theoretic principles of the thesis, thanks are due to Alexander Thompson. My 
appreciation as well to Paul Manna and Lindsay Hundley for providing help with quantitative research and 
data analytics, and to Amy Oakes and Laurie Koloski for advice and support. Thanks, too, to the ATOP project, 
Polity Project, and Patricia Weitsman and George Shambaugh for the data used in the quantitative analysis. 
Finally, special thanks to Robert Kenzer for advice, editing, and encouragement as well as to Sue Peterson for 
inspiring, driving, and supporting this project. 
1 Lisa Martin, “The President and International Commitments: Treaties as Signaling Devices,” 
Presidential Studies Quarterly 35, no. 3 (2005): 448. 
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thesis analyzes these issues by addressing the role a state’s ratification structure plays in 
alliance formation, structure, and reliability. 
 My argument contains two parts. I hypothesize, first, that ratification plays a 
significant role in alliance formation and structure. As ratification requirements become 
more rigorous, alliance formation becomes less likely, and negotiators will increasingly 
structure alliances so as to attain domestic support. Second, ratified alliances will be more 
reliable. This behavior occurs because the balance of threat within and outside of the 
alliance is altered; alliance members perceive less offensive intent from friends who have 
put their domestic and international reputation on the line. Also, by driving alliances to be 
clearly structured, alliance ratification helps control for the dynamics of changing state 
interests, ideas, and policies. 
 This argument fills important gaps in the IR literature, tying together work on 
commitment, ratification, and alliances. Above all, comparing the literature on commitment 
formation and compliance to that on alliance formation and reliability allows us to observe 
how domestic variables drive alliance dynamics. Concurrently, alliances can be used to test 
theories of commitment, expanding understandings in both sub-fields. Finally, by linking 
ratification with alliances, I expand the still-nascent literature on ratification. 
Merging these issue areas helps answer a number of wider theoretical, 
paradigmatic, and policy-oriented questions. For example, how do the second and third 
levels of analysis interact in security affairs? What if alliances, the key mechanism in realist 
balance-of-power, are driven not by simple cost-benefit analyses, but instead by 
interactions between domestic and international politics? Likewise, how do liberal and 
constructivist theories of commitment relate to realist theories of military alliances? Are 
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these theories compatible? Regarding policy, should the United States care whether 
friendly nations formally ratify alliance agreements?  Should domestic audiences mobilize 
lobbyists and war chests over alliance ratification?  
To investigate these questions, the thesis proceeds as follows. First, I review the 
international relations literature in four areas: commitments, ratification, alliance 
formation, and alliance reliability. Second, I outline my argument about how domestic 
politics and formal ratification alters alliance formation, structure, and reliability. Third, I 
perform a number of case studies on the ratification of League of Nations. Fourth, I perform 
regressions attempting to get at the connections between alliance ratification and 
structure, as well as ratification and reliability. Overall, I suggest that there exists 
inconclusive evidence that ratification, through the mechanisms of alliance structure and 
the balance of threat, increases alliance reliability but that the exact relationship between 
ratification and reliability is powerful.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section first reviews the literature on international commitments, broadly 
defined: Why do states commit? How do domestic actors influence commitments? And why 
do states choose to comply? After addressing these questions, I review several subsets of 
the commitment literature. First, I appraise theories of ratification, asking whether 
ratification affects commitment and compliance. Second, I evaluate the literature on a 
specific type of commitment, military alliances. This literature explores both alliance 
formation and alliance reliability. Key questions include why alliances form, why they can 
be unreliable, what determines alliance reliability, and whether alliance reliability and 
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formation are similar to commitment ratification and compliance. Tying together the 
literature on formal commitments (ratification) with the literature on alliances improves 
our understanding of the relationship between alliance formation, treaty ratification, and 
alliance reliability. 
 
Commitment and Compliance 
The literature on commitments and compliance is extensive. Commitments are 
defined as the act of contracting into a given agreement. The agreement can be either 
multilateral (a global trade agreement or a new human rights accord) or bilateral (an 
agreement to reduce arms between the United States and the Soviet Union or an agreement 
by the United States to come to Japan’s aid in times of war). In either case, the agreement 
aspires to solicit some prescribed form of behavior, a “state of conformity or identity 
between an actor’s behavior and a specified rule.” This state, as defined by Kal Raustiala 
and Anne-Marie Slaughter, is compliance. In other words, compliance represents the 
pursuit of a prescribed behavior described in the commitment.2  
In “Compliance with International Agreements,” Beth Simmons divides the 
compliance literature into four schools. Realism stresses the dominance of power and 
national interest over global legal institutions. To realists “international law [and the 
nature of commitments at large] is merely an epiphenomenon of interests or is only made 
                                                        
 2 Kal Raustiala and Anne-Marie Slaughter, “International Law, International Relations, and 
Compliance,” in Handbook of International Relations, eds. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth Simmons 
(London: SAGE Publications, 2005): 539.  Commitment and compliance are distinguishable from 
“cooperation,” which, as described by Jervis, involves actors working towards or arriving “at goals that they 
recognize as being in their common interest.” See Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” 
World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 167. In other words, whereas commitment means agreeing to enact a given 
behavior and compliance suggests exercising that commitment, cooperation means the state of actors 
generally working together. This definition of compliance closely resembles that used by Beth Simmons in 
“Compliance with International Agreements.” See Beth Simmons, “Compliance with International 
Agreements,” Annual Review of Political Science, 1, (1998): 75-93. 
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effective through the balance of power.”3 Rational functionalists also see states as driven by 
realpolitik motivations, but emphasize the capacity of international agreements to resolve 
“the collective good.”4 Instead of emphasizing the need for collective action, democratic 
legalists argue that democracies “solve” the compliance puzzle because their normative and 
political structures make them more likely to comply.5 Finally, normative approaches argue 
that international standards of conduct drive compliance.6 Each of these schools frame 
compliance’s nature differently, emphasizing different variables that lead to commitment. 
Each theory in turn proposes an alternate reason that states enter into commitments, 
whether to adjust the balance of power (realism), seek an otherwise unobtainable 
collective good (functionalism), or establish international legal order and norms 
(democratic legalism or normative approaches).  
Regardless of school of thought, most theorists emphasize a rationalist framework 
of commitment formation. For example, many scholars argue that decision-makers commit 
because they perceive a need to cooperate internationally. Helen Milner, for instance, 
contends that cooperation (and by extension commitment) occurs when “political leaders… 
believe that the political benefits from international cooperation outweigh the costs; that is, 
the no cooperation outcome is seen as worse than the cooperative one.”7  
                                                        
 3 Simmons, “Compliance With International Agreements,” 79.  
 4 Ibid., 80. 
5 See Ibid., 84 and Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty: Compliance With 
International Regulatory Agreements, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998): 252.  
6 John Ruggie touches on this concept when he argues “international economic regimes provide a 
permissive environment for the emergence of specific kinds of international transaction flows that actors 
take to be complementary to the particular fusion of power and purpose that is embodied within those 
regimes.” See John Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the 
Postwar Economic Order,” International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982): 383. See also, Simmons, “Compliance 
With International Agreements,” 85-88. 
 7 Lisa Martin, Interests, Institutions, and Information, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997): 
46. 
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Commitments are influenced both by international conditions and by pressures on 
national leaders. Systemic considerations include the fear of a potential military hegemony, 
concern over environmental degradation, and a desire to stabilize global trade flows.8 For 
example, Robert Jervis claims that the systemic incentives for states to commit to concerts 
includes the offense-defense balance, changes in payoffs, and increased gains from 
cooperation.  
Domestic sources of commitment include a desire for a regime to stabilize its hold 
on power or a hope to please a powerful sub-state audience. Edward Mansfield and Jon 
Pevehouse argue, for instance, that democratizing regimes commit to international 
organizations so as to credibly reform “by establishing a mechanism that increases the cost 
of deviating from these efforts [democratization] and backsliding.”9 James Vreeland also 
illustrates how second-image institutional designs may drive commitments. He alleges not 
only that autocracies commit less often to human rights treaties, but also that the structure 
of autocratic regimes influences their decision to commit. “Typical” dictatorships are more 
likely than “multiparty dictatorships” to agree to measures such as the United Nations 
Convention Against Torture.10 Vreeland asserts this occurs because “torture is more likely 
to occur when power is shared” among domestic actors.11 
Scholarship generally emphasizes that domestic factions, embedded in domestic 
structures, drive ratification. Robert Putnam in “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The 
                                                        
8 Robert Jervis, “From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security,” World Politics 38, no. 1 
(1985): 62-78. 
 9 Edward Mansfield and Jon Pevehouse, “Democratization and International Organizations,” 
International Organization 60, no. 1 (2006): 141. 
10  James Vreeland, “Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictatorships Enter into the United 
Nations Convention Against Torture,” International Organization 62, no. 1 (2008): 65-101. 
 11 Ibid., 69. 
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Logic of Two-Level Games” paints an evocative picture of domestic determinants of foreign 
policy: 
Each national political leader appears at both [the international and 
domestic] game boards. Across the international table sit his foreign 
counterparts, and at his elbow sit diplomats and other international 
advisers. Around his domestic table behind him sit party and parliamentary 
figures, spokesperson for domestic agencies, representative of key interest 
groups, and the leader’s own political advisors…. Moves that are rational for 
a player at one board… may be impolitic for that same player at the other 
board. Nevertheless, there are powerful incentives for consistency between 
the two games.12 
 
In his case study of the Bonn Conference of 1978, Putnam studies players on both boards.  
In particular, the “player” President Jimmy Carter had to balance the international 
demands for global deflation with domestic debate over his National Energy Program.13 
Carter and other leaders, constrained by two semi-exclusive win-sets, were forced to merge 
their preferences as both second-level and third-level actors.14  
In her “ratification game,” Milner also points to the role of domestic forces in treaty 
commitment. Milner argues that numerous considerations – including divided domestic 
government, asymmetry of information, and less informed “endorsers” – reduce the chance 
for global cooperation.15 According to Milner, “polyarchy [a system between hierarchy and 
anarchy both domestically and internationally, driven in part by the complexity of domestic 
politics] makes cooperation less likely.”16 Thus, for both Putnam and Milner, domestic 
politics limits the opportunities for commitment, as actors in the second image limit 
                                                        
12  Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International 
Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 434. 
 13 Ibid., 427-428. 
 14 Putnam defines win-sets as “the set of all possible Level I [international/systemic] agreements that 
would “win” – that is, gain the necessary majority among the constituents – when simply voted up or down.” 
Ibid., 437. 
 15 Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information, 70-98. 
 16 Ibid., 98. 
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negotiable win-sets.17  
So far, the literature has explained that commitment broadly defined may resolve 
both domestic and international problems. The motivations, and restraints on, these 
commitments may come from either or both the domestic and international levels. The 
question, then, is what leads to commitment violation – that is, a breakdown of compliance?  
Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes use an “efficiency model,” (also called the “managerial 
thesis”), to claim that changing cost-benefit calculations impact compliance.18 
Commitments are typically violated due to “ambiguity and indeterminacy of treaty 
language… limitation of the capacity of parties… [or] the temporal dimension of the social 
and economic changes contemplated.”19 This managerial account of compliance is not 
without critics. Realists, for example, hark back to the words of Machiavelli: “a prudent 
ruler cannot keep his word, nor should he, where such fidelity would damage him, and 
when the reasons that made him promise are no longer relevant.”20 Democratic legalists, 
meanwhile look to Vreeland or Martin, who argue that democracy’s commitments prove 
more “credible” than those of autocratic states. 
 The compliance literature, in sum, remains divided among multiple explanations. 
Overall, the literature shows that compliance remains imperfect, that both domestic and 
international forces drive both the decision to commit and the extent of compliance. 
                                                        
 17 These works represent a functionalist/democratic legalist framework. Realists would likely 
contain these factors within the “black box.” For a normative description of domestic-international 
interrelations related to commitment, see James N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Exploring 
Governance in a Turbulent World, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997): 418-419.  
 18 Abram Chayes and Antonia Chayes, “On Compliance,” International Organization 47, no. 2 (1993): 
178.  
 19 Ibid., 188. These arguments are in defiance of the “enforcement school,” which emphasizes the role 
of international enforcement mechanisms. 
 20 Ibid., 177. 
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Studying specific types of commitment, such as military alliances, can bring greater 
precision to these concepts and theories. Military alliances, commitments that aspire to 
elicit a prescribed behavior of cooperative military action, help us to understand 
commitment formation. The other piece of the puzzle, the nature of ratification, not only 
expands our understanding of compliance, but also of commitment.  
 
Ratification 
Ratification, the formal process whereby a domestic audience approves a 
commitment, represents a subset of the commitment literature focusing on the legal 
method of forming international agreements.21 Some may argue that ratification simply 
represents a mechanism of commitment. However, ratification also explains, at least in 
part, why states commit and in particular why they ally militarily with one another. Thus, 
discussing ratification allows for a nuanced exploration of commitment formation and 
compliance. Studying ratification also illustrates how commitments vary across issue areas. 
Just as theorists ask, “why commit?” we may ask “why ratify?” Or rather, why 
commit by ratifying? Lisa Martin argues that a key reason that treaties are formalized is to 
signal the seriousness and reliability of the commitment.22 In many cases, domestic actors 
also prefer ratification as it grants them a voice in negotiations. Ratification may have 
numerous effects on the actual commitment. The most direct effect would be voiding the 
                                                        
21 Ratification is often couched in terms of a formal process whereby domestic actors play a role in 
approving a treaty negotiated by the executive. This process may involve a referendum, a formal vote by the 
legislature, or other measures. See Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Daniel S. Morey, “The French ‘Petit Oui’: The 
Maastricht Treaty and the French Voting Agenda,” The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 38, no. 1 (2007): 65-
87 and Dan Caldwell and Michael Krepon, The Politics of Arms Control Treaty Ratification (New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1991). Robert Putnam posits that this process does not have to be inherently democratic. For 
example, the Meiji Constitution ensured that the Japanese military would have a determining role in ratifying 
the London Naval Treaty. Robert Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,” 437. 
 22 Martin, “The President and International Commitments: Treaties as Signaling Devices.”  
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commitment -- a legislature may fail to approve a commitment or a public may vote the 
commitment down in a referendum.  Regarding Martin’s signaling device, ratification may 
also allow domestic actors to impose “costs” on the executive, such as increased oversight. 
Many theorists posit that ratification represents a critical aspect of commitment 
formation. Specifically, the “two level perspective,” based on the work of Robert Putnam, 
contends that “leaders have interests in both the domestic and international domains and 
simultaneously calculate the domestic and international implications of their actions.”23 In 
such a theory, constituent ratification represents one half of the game at play.24 The nature 
of ratification also permits states to construct reservations and understandings. Such 
mechanisms allow a state to tailor treaty enforcement to its specific conditions, at times 
helping countries skirt the most critical aspects of a commitment.25 The rigors of the 
ratification process may also drive international governmental organizations (IGOs) to 
create “offshoots” within their organization. The hope is that by simply expanding existing 
IGOs, the costs of “a new treaty that would require signature and ratification to take effect” 
can be avoided. 26 Thus, ratification represents a powerful check on commitment behavior, 
influencing IGO development, elite negotiating styles, and executive enforcement 
procedures. 
 An example of the influence of ratification on IGO’s occurred in the 1992 French 
referendum on the Maastricht Treaty. The French public approved the treaty with only 
                                                        
 23 Nathalie Frensley, “Ratification Processes and Conflict Termination,” Journal of Peace Research 35, 
no. 2 (1998): 170. 
 24 John Burton applies a particularly interesting version of this theory arguing that many 
commitments experience “entry problems,” where elites will commitments to fail, as they know that they 
cannot receive domestic support. Ibid., 171. 
 25 Eric Neumayer, “Qualified Ratification: Explaining Reservations to International Human Rights 
Treaties,” The Journal of Legal Studies 36, no. 2 (2007): 397-429. 
 26Harold Jacobson, William Reisinger, and Todd Mathers, “National Entanglements in International 
Governmental Organizations,” The American Political Science Review 80, no. 1 (1986): 145.  
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51% of the vote, a much smaller margin than expected. This “petit oui,” defied expectations 
of 75%+ support for the Treaty. Accordingly, as Michael Lewis-Beck and Daniel Morey note, 
“the evaporation of this support… sent a shock through the European political and 
economic community,” resulting in a more contentious and complex process in approving 
the 2005 European Union Constitution.27 
Not only does ratification represent a critical aspect of the commitment process in 
many states it also provides a basis for compliance. For example, Robert Putnam suggests 
that authoritarian leaders cannot make credible commitments, as they have no reliable 
mechanism to pledge their domestic audience to a given treaty.28 J. Timmons Roberts, 
Bradley Parks, and Alexis Vasquez take this argument a step further, declaring “if a state’s 
willingness or ability to implement an international environmental treaty is weak, or even 
in question… cooperation is unlikely.”29 In other words, even when ratification proves 
successful, if there is significant domestic dissent, the nature of a state’s commitment and 
compliance may still come under question.  
  Considering the importance of ratification, one might expect a vibrant literature on 
the ratification of security commitments and alliances. Thus, it is surprising that no such 
literature exists. The importance of research on alliance formation becomes even clearer 
when we consider that ratification affects issue areas in different ways. For example, the 
ratification of environmental treaties is driven by the vibrancy of competition among 
lobbyist groups, state size, the state’s net wealth, and policymakers views of free trade and 
                                                        
27 Michael Lewis-Beck and Daniel Morey, “The French ‘Petit Oui’,” 65-87. 
 28 Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,” 449. 
29  J. Timmons Roberts, Bradley Parks, and Alexis Vasquez, “Who Ratifies Environmental Treaties and 
Why? Institutionalism, Structuralism and Participation by 192 Nations in 22 Treaties,” Global Environmental 
Politics 4, no. 3 (2004): 27. 
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global externalities.30 In contrast, Vreeland emphasizes that the ratification of human rights 
treaties are affected by regime and institutional structures.31 Meanwhile, Lewis-Beck and 
Morey’s discussion of the ratification of the Maastricht political treaty emphasizes both 
political conditions (elite discord, partisanship) and views on national sovereignty.32  
 On the whole, a number of lessons can be gleaned from the ratification literature. 
First, a strategic logic of ratification exists, and this reasoning relates to the strategic logic 
of commitments. Second, ratification represents a critical aspect of the commitment 
process, impacting not only the formation of commitments but also long-time compliance 
with these agreements. Third, ratification theories emphasize that determinants of 
ratification vary across issue areas. All these concepts add “pieces” to the puzzle of alliance 
ratification. However, to gain a complete perspective, we must include two more 
literatures: works on alliance formation and alliance reliability. 
 
Alliances: Formation & Reliability 
If commitments are understood as “as an actor contracting into a given agreement,” 
then alliances may be conceived of as cooperative military agreements designed to commit 
a state to the maintenance, use, or potential use of force.33 In other words, alliances are a 
particular type of commitment based on military power. To investigate alliance ratification 
and reliability, this section follows a similar logic to previous ones, explaining the strategic 
                                                        
 30 See Paola Conconi, “Green Lobbies and Transboundary Pollution in Large Open Economies,” 
Journal of International Economics 59, (2003): 399-422; Conoci, Toke S. Aidt, “Political Internalization of 
Economic Externalities and Environmental Policy,” Journal of Public Economics 69, (1998): 1-16; and J. 
Timmons Roberts, Bradley Parks, and Alexis Vasquez, “Who Ratifies Environmental Treaties and Why?” 
 31 Vreeland, “Political Institutions and Human Rights.” 
 32 Lewis-Beck and Morey, “The French ‘Petit Oui’,” 85. 
 33 For the sake of this thesis, I will focus on “entente” and “defensive” alliances. This typology is based 
in part on the typology used in the Correlates of War project. See J. David Singer and Melvin Small, “Formal 
alliances, 1815-1939: A Quantitative Description,” Journal of Peace Research 3, no. 1 (1966): 1-32.  
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logic behind alliance formation, the role of domestic politics in alliance formation, the effect 
of alliance formation on alliance reliability, and the overall determinants of alliance 
reliability.  
Systemic variables are typically used to explain alliance formation. For example, 
Stephen Walt in “Alliance Formation and the Balance of Threat” argues:  
The proposition that states will join alliances in order to avoid domination 
by stronger powers lies at the heart of traditional balance of power theory. 
According to this hypothesis, states join alliances to protect themselves 
from states or coalitions whose superior resources could pose a threat.34 
 
In other words, states form alliances due to a series of cost-benefit analyses based on 
relative power. Other scholars have built on this realist model. Todd Sandler, for example, 
charges that alliance cost-benefit analysis is based upon concepts such as the reduced cost 
of defense, enhanced deterrence, and joint maneuvers.35 In “From Balance to Concert,” 
Jervis also highlights different variables driving alliance formation, including the offense-
defense balance and systemic transparency.36 Similarly, Mark Cresenzi et al. use variables 
such as an alliance partner’s reputation of reliability, and Alistair Smith stresses the nature 
of defensive alliances and deterrent calculations.37 
                                                        
 34 Stephen Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9, no. 4 
(1985): 4. See also Kenneth Waltz, “The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory,” Journal of Interdisciplinary 
History 18, no. 4 (1988): 619: “From the vantage point of neorealist theory, competition and conflict among 
states stem directly from the twin facts of life under conditions of anarchy: States in an anarchic order must 
provide for their own security, and threats or seeming threats to their security abound. Preoccupation with 
identifying dangers and counteracting them become a way of life…. Their individual intentions aside, 
collectively their actions yield arms races and alliances.” 
 35 Todd Sandler, “Alliance Formation, Alliance Expansion, and the Core,” The Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 43, no. 6 (1999): 727-747. 
 36 Jervis, “From Balance to Concert,” 62-78.  
37 Mark Crescenzi, Jacob Kathman, Katja Kleinberg, and Reed Wood, “Reliability, Reputation, and 
Alliance Formation,” International Studies Quarterly 56, (2012): 259-274. Alistair Smith; “Alliance Formation 
and War,” International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 4 (1995): 405-425.  
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Little ground has been broken in how domestic politics impact alliance formation. 
Similarly, no ground has been broken regarding the role of ratification in alliance 
formation. The process of alliance formation is taken as a given; theorists posit that states 
form alliances based on a unitary cost-benefit analysis, not a debate between domestic and 
international actors. 
 Before discussing the causes of alliance reliability, it is worthwhile to discuss 
whether alliances generally appear to be reliable or unreliable.38 Just as theories of alliance 
formation underline the importance of systemic variables, theories about alliance 
reliability emphasizes the anarchic, morality-free nature of international politics. In other 
words, scholars contend that alliances are only reliable when the commitment’s goals suit 
both sides. In such a world, defection should be quite common. For example, scholars point 
out that even in one of the world’s most famous moments of alliance formation, the 
“Concerts of Europe,” cooperation was fleeting.39 
 Numerous studies have investigated the reliability of alliances. For example, in 
“Formal Alliances, 1815-1939: A Quantitative Description,” J. David Singer and Melvin 
Small find that between 1815 and 1945, allies only aided one another twenty-three percent 
of the time. In a further eight percent of cases, states opposed their so-called ally.40 
However, if only major power alliances were studied, then forty-eight percent of the time 
                                                        
 38 Alliance reliability is defined as actors adhering to the “constraints and obligations” placed upon 
them by formal military commitments. 
 39 “The term ‘Concert of Europe,” is often applied to late 19th-century international politics, but the 
pursuit of self-interest was not sufficiently transformed to justify this label. The two 20th-century concerts 
were very brief, and one can argue that they did not really come into existence at all.” Robert Jervis, “From 
Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security,” 58-59. It should be noted that there is some theoretic 
pushback to this idea.  
 40 Note that “ally” in this case includes ententes, nonaggression pacts, and neutrality agreements. J. 
David Singer and Melvin Small, “Formal Alliances, 1815-1939: A Quantitative Description,” Journal of Peace 
Research 3, no. 1 (1966): 18. 
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allies aided each other, forty-eight percent of the time they remained neutral, and five 
percent of the time they opposed one another.41 Meanwhile, Brett Ashley Leeds observes 
that alliance commitments “are fulfilled about 75 percent of the time.”42 Alistair Smith, on 
the other hand, claims the exact opposite: alliances are reliable only 25% of the time.43 
Smith also notes that the empirical record of alliance reliability is inherently muddled. 
Studies of alliance reliability are likely to face problems of selection bias, and only “a small 
proportion of alliances need to be unreliable to generate the empirical observation that 
alliances are on average unreliable.”44 Considering this empirical and theoretical record, it 
seems that alliances generally unreliable. Meanwhile, the literature has not been able to 
establish conclusively whether alliances are only somewhat unreliable or radically 
unreliable.  
 Robert Rothstein concludes in Alliances and Small Powers “it is a truism to assert 
that the ultimate success or failure of an alliance depends on the way in which it is 
maintained. It involves translating the common interests and aims which unite the allies 
into effective operational policies.”45 Such arguments are common in regards to what make 
alliances reliable – the interests and aims of partners must be maintained. Beyond this 
congruence of interests, political scientists have pointed to numerous variables that drive 
alliance reliability. For example, Rothstein also notes that for an alliance to remain reliable, 
                                                        
 41 Ibid., 19. 
 42 Brett Ashley Leeds, “Alliance Reliability in Times of War: Explaining State Decisions to Violate 
Treaties,” International Organization 57, no. 4 (2003): 801-827.  
43 “If a nation becomes involved in a conflict then it might expect its allies to intervene on its behalf. 
However, empirically, alliance reliability is low. For every three or four opportunities to intervene on behalf 
of an ally, only one is used. Although the presence of an alliance increases the probability of allied aid during a 
war, it does not guarantee it.” Alastair Smith, “Alliance Formation and War,” International Studies Quarterly 
39, no. 4 (1995): 406.  
 44 Ibid., 418. 
 45 Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968): 55. 
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states must maintain a “similar conception of power” alongside similar values and believe 
that they will receive an equitable distribution of benefits. In his theory, alliances fall apart 
because of changes in strategic calculations, or because new policymakers come to power 
with different beliefs about benefits and costs.46 
 Other scholars emphasize different variables driving alliance reliability. Patricia 
Weitsman, in Dangerous Alliances, concludes that states determine the viability of alliances 
by calculating the balance of internal versus external threat. In her formulation, the Allies 
fell out after World War II because the U.S. and Soviets saw each other as greater threats 
than any external power. Meanwhile NATO survived the fall of the USSR because member 
states did not see each other as threatening as external dangers latent in the system.47 
Additionally, Keith Grant claims that the congruence of alliance portfolio’s, i.e. the size and 
capabilities of member states determine alliance reliability.48 Regardless of specific 
arguments, most theorists emphasize that a couple of key factors drive alliance reliability: 
the structure of power and threat within the alliance and the congruence of incentives and 
interests within the alliance. These theories of alliance reliability rarely reference the role 
of ratification or domestic politics. 
 
Conclusion 
 A review of scholarship surrounding ratification, compliance, commitment, alliance 
formation, and alliance reliability illustrates that although the literatures are deeply 
                                                        
 46 This latter conception obviously brings in the idea of domestic variables. Nonetheless, Rothstein 
and theorists like him have still failed to flesh out the full role of domestic variables. Robert Rothstein, 
Alliances and Small Powers, 55-59. 
47 Patricia  Weitsman, Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War, (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 2004): 12-37. 
 48 Keith Grant, “Outsourcing Security: Alliance Portfolio Size, Capability, and Reliability,” International 
Studies Quarterly 57, no. 2 (2013): 418-429.   
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connected, a theory linking them remains elusive. From a “levels of analysis” perspective, 
this poses a problem whereby most commitments are explained as a product of second-
level variables, but military commitments are explained by third-level variables. In short, 
the de-linking of alliance, commitment, and compliance theories leaves an incomplete 
understanding of each topic. 
 These problems extend into the individual issue areas. For example, in “Compliance 
With International Agreements,” Simmons notes that the compliance literature suffers 
from two key problems: selection bias (much compliance occurs in areas of minimal 
difficulty) and endogeneity (“it is difficult to show that a rule, commitment, or norm per se 
influenced governments to take particular positions…”).49 These problems have caused 
scholars to warn against typical measures of compliance. Lisa Martin, in “Against 
Compliance,” suggests that the study of compliance would benefit from “the direct 
measurement of the policies states implement and from counterfactual analysis.”50 
 Studying alliance reliability resolves these problems. Alliances typically do not form 
meaninglessly; thus, they do not represent “easy compliance.” Moreover, it is relatively 
easy to see when states “comply” to the rules of a military alliance – did they defend their 
neighbor? Did they help in an aggressive war? Meanwhile, the study of alliance reliability 
would benefit from greater reference to domestic variables. Accordingly, this thesis will use 
a framework that synthesizes issue areas, paradigms, and IR “images.” Digging down into 
policymaker perceptions, it will suggest reliability, credibility, commitment, and 
                                                        
49 Simmons notes, “If the central analytical issue is to understand the conditions under which states behave 
in accordance with rules to which they have committed themselves or, more broadly, in accordance with prevailing 
norms of international behavior, then it is important to isolate the impact of those rules and norms.” Beth Simmons, 
“Compliance With International Agreements,” 89.  
50 Lisa Martin, “Against Compliance,” in International Law and International Relations: Synthesizing 
Insights from Interdisciplinary Scholarship, Jeffrey L. Dunoff and Mark Pollack, eds. (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013): 591-610. 
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compliance are interconnected. This theoretical net will bring together a selection of 
variables and theories. In the end, a more complete perspective will be granted, one that 
promotes a clearer understanding of global commitment and cooperation. 
 
A THEORY OF ALLIANCE RATIFICATION 
 This thesis draws links between ratification and alliance formation, structure, and 
reliability. As a state’s treaty ratification mechanisms becomes more demanding, the state 
will be constrained in forming alliances. Meanwhile, as these mechanisms become more 
rigorous, alliances obligations will be more specified. Finally, ratified alliances will be more 
reliable, as they will mitigate both conflicts of interest and concerns over the balance of 
threat.   
 
Ratification and Alliance Formation 
 “Alliance ratification” represents the mechanism by which domestic audiences 
approve an alliance commitment. Alliances, by their very nature as commitments towards 
the maintenance, use, or potential use of force often draw the interest, and sometimes the 
opprobrium, of domestic interest groups. Considering the attention of domestic forces and 
the structured nature of alliance commitments, we may conclude that ratification has the 
potential to impact both the formation of alliances and the structure of those alliances 
formed. 
 Domestic ratification and alliance formation are linked via a state’s ratification 
structure, as this structure will determine the ease with which the state formalizes its 
relationships with its allies. These ratification structures are defined as the formal and 
informal political structures that determine who ratifies international agreements and the 
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process by which these actors enact ratification. In part, these structures are based on 
regime types -- democratic checks and balances will often necessitate higher barriers to 
ratification than in authoritarian states. However, the regime type dichotomy fails to 
describe fully the variety of ways by which states ratify treaties. 
To establish that the regime type dichotomy does not fully capture ratification rules, 
we can compare the American structure for ratification with those of democratic European 
governments. In the U.S., treaties move through any number of veto portals – a committee 
vote, a Senate-wide vote requiring two-thirds support, and Presidential endorsement.  
Meanwhile, ratification in Britain formally involves only signature and deposition by the 
Foreign Secretary, but in many instances includes a majority vote as well as consultation 
with Britain’s “devolved administrations.”51 Meanwhile, in France, treaties are formally 
ratified by “an act of Parliament.”52 Here, the process differs as treaty negotiations occur 
through the President and not the Prime Minister. Treaties, thus, may be more likely to face 
opposition in the face of “cohabitation,” or other instances of wider legislative dissent. 
Thus, between these three democratic countries, ratification occurs through notably 
different mechanisms. We can thus see that an authoritarian-democratic dichotomy does 
not properly represent the variety of ratification structures possible.  
                                                        
 51 For a more in-depth breakdown of British ratification, including legal definitions and the 
Ponsonbury Rule, see United Kingdom Ministry of Justice, The Governance of Britain – War Powers and 
Treaties: Limiting Executive Powers (Norwich: British Licensing Division, 2007): 69-89. Overall, it can be 
understood that ratification in the United Kingdom requires majority parliamentary approval – an approval 
that should generally prove straightforward given that parliamentary first-past-the-post administrations can 
be expected to win majority votes without competition.  
 52 “Article 53. Peace Treaties, Trade agreements, treaties or agreements relating to international 
organization, those committing the finances of the State, those modifying provisions which are the preserve 
of statute law, those relating to the status of persons, and those involving the ceding, exchanging or acquiring 
of territory, may be ratified or approved only by an Act of Parliament. They shall not take effect until such 
ratification or approval has been secured.”Asemblée Nationale, Legal Text: Constitution of October 4, 1958, 
Last modification unknown, http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/english/. 
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Ratification, thus, should be thought of along a spectrum of restrictiveness, not as a 
comparison between authoritarian and democratic states. Restrictiveness can be 
understood as those institutional moments that impede, slow down, or draw attention to 
the ratification process. Regardless of how many actors, values, or opinions towards 
ratification exist in the system, these informal and formal institutions will ensure that 
dissenting opinions, no matter how small, have the opportunity to voice their concerns or 
impede the ratification process. Such stopgaps could include the need for a majority (or 
two-thirds) vote in the legislature, mandatory approval from federal or devolved bodies, 
endorsement from the military, requirements towards a referendum, coalition politics, etc. 
Overall, then, “restrictions” are institutional mechanisms that make the ratification process 
more “rigorous.” 
Although states can exist at any point along this spectrum, three “levels” of 
restriction predominate. At the low end of restrictiveness, there exists little check on treaty 
ratification. This may occur because the state has a one-party system, where the legislature 
can consistently be expected to actualize the executive’s desires. It may also occur in an 
authoritarian system where there exists no formal (or informal) check on the executive and 
no mechanism for ratification. Some democratic systems may also face few ratification 
restrictions – especially parliamentary governments using first-past-the-post electoral 
rules emphasizing two-party domination. In such systems, the prime minister can often 
expect treaties negotiated on his behalf to sail through legislative ratification. 
 Moderately restrictive state structures, on the other hand, will require some sort of 
legislative mechanism towards treaty ratification. For example, the treaty may require 
majority approval from parliament. Many political systems operate here – it acts as a happy 
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medium between highly restrictive ratification requirements and more carte blanche 
setups. Ratification will often progress unopposed, but at times it will become more 
wrought.  
 Finally, some states have extremely restrictive legislative mechanisms, such as 
requiring two-thirds approval. The most common example of this is the ratification 
structure embodied in the U.S. Senate. Such systems may also require a treaty to move 
through a rigorous committee system or to face opportunities for the inclusion of 
reservations. Restrictions on ratification, however, need not be based solely on legislative 
institutional design. For example, a multiparty system will gravitate towards the restrictive 
side of the spectrum, as treaties will require the support of numerous parties within a 
coalition government. Given the ideological gulf that may exist between parties in a 
multiparty system, day-to-day governance may prove difficult, let alone the ratification of 
international treaties. Likewise, federal systems may maintain restrictive ratification 
regimens. Belgian ratification, where the agreement requires approval from “two Federal 
chambers of parliament, as well as three separate regional governments, ”embodies this 
principle.53 
This spectrum of ratification restrictions relates generally to the idea of veto 
players, but not exactly. Haftel and Thompson define “veto players” as “a function of the 
number of actors whose agreements is [sic] needed for policy change and other 
institutional constraints on decision making.” Thompson and Haftel argue that these veto 
players constrain the executive and make ratification of trade treaties less likely.54 
                                                        
 53 Yoram Z. Haftel and Alexander Thompson, “Delayed Ratification: The Domestic Fate of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties,” International Organization 67, no. 2 (2013): 360. 
 54 Ibid., 360. 
 Ratification structures are defined, however, not simply by the blockage points for 
approval, but also by those moments that allow for domestic input, oversight, and 
mobilization.55 For example, treaty reservations do not act as a st
approval (a veto), but instead as a mechanism to alter the calculations and understandings 
behind the alliance. Such reservations, if properly exercised, could also alter the structure 
of the treaty, creating a direct line between
Thus, ratification restrictions influence international politics in ways that are more 
complex than veto player politics.
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more publicity about the treaty may engender elite or public backlash. If a state has a less 
structured or less restrictive system for ratifying alliance treaties, there will be fewer 
opportunities for opposition to arise or for veto players to defeat the treaty.  
 Second, states with steeper ratification requirements will negotiate alliances that 
more clearly spell out the alliance’s structures. This is because negotiators will argue that 
they have to “sell” the alliance at home, and thus the agreement will have to be clear 
regarding what is expected of both sides. Milner argues that “in all cases anticipation 
reaction is at work: the agenda setter(s) and/or amenders will always try to craft bills or 
negotiate agreements that the executive, a majority in parliament, and/or the public will 
ratify afterwards.”56  Since negotiators will fear that domestic opposition will use a treaty’s 
ambiguities to defeat it, structuring the alliance represents a method for increasing the 
chance of ratification.  Thus, negotiators will seek treaties that spell out obligations clearly, 
preventing the opposition from using ambiguities for their own benefit. Finally, alliance 
obligations will need to be clear so that information is easily transmitted to “endorsers,” 
those actors who help drive domestic legislative behavior by resolving problems of 
asymmetrical information.57  
 The Ideological Origins of Great Powers by Mark Haas provides a compelling example 
of how domestic actors can limit alliance formation. Haas argues that between 1933 and 
1939, the foreign policies of Britain and France were framed by the actions of their political 
parties. Haas contends that although realist theory can “explain important dimensions of 
British and French foreign policies in the 1930’s,” it cannot fully account for why Britain 
                                                        
 56  Milner, Interests, Institutions, and Information, 106. 
 57 Lisa Martin, Interests, Institutions, and Information, 46. 
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and France failed to balance Nazi Germany.58 He suggests that this variation can be 
explained by looking at the dynamics of French and British political parties. Whereas 
conservatives in these countries often downplayed the German threat or alternatively 
favored using Italy to balance Germany, leftists were loath to aligning with Italy, instead 
favoring an alliance with the Soviets.59 Political conditions at the time meant that even 
when one of these factions was in the minority, it often became embroiled in governing 
coalitions or at least governing politics.60 The parties could thus veto alliances with 
countries they opposed. Thus, Haas provides a clear example of how domestic structures 
and politics can drive alliance formation – something that becomes even more explicit 
when considering alliance ratification’s role in alliance formation. 
 Variables that scholars have deemed relevant to ratification include the vibrancy of 
competition among lobbyist groups, policymaker’s views, regime type, institutional 
structure, elite discord, and partisanship.61 Many of these variables are clearly relevant in 
the ratification of alliance treaties. In the theoretic model proposed, regime type and 
institutional structure will drive the structure of alliance ratification. These structures, in 
turn, will help frame how lobbyist groups compete, how policymaker’s views arise, and 
                                                        
58 Mark Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789-1989 (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 2005), 120-121.  
 59 Haas’s analysis here is quite illuminating: “British and French conservatives desired alignment 
with Italy as an aid against possible German aggression, but for the bulk of the decade refused association 
with the Soviet Union. In fact, some British and French conservatives’ antipathy to the USSR was so great that 
they advocated aligning with Nazi Germany against communist Russia. Conversely ,the majority of members 
from parties from the British and French left pushed hard for an alliance with the Soviet union against 
Germany, but shunned alignment with Italy.” Ibid., 121. 
 60 The French government between 1933 and 1940 was dominated by rightist/conservative 
alliances, although the Popular Front government between 1936 and 1938 proved influential enough to 
muddle conservative foreign policies. Likewise, although Labor was in the British parliamentary minority, 
they were “able to do significant damage to prospects of an Anglo-Italian détente through the imposition of 
sanctions after the 1935 Ethiopian invasion. See Ibid., 121.  
 61 See footnotes 34 and 35, referencing Vreeland, “Political Institutions and Human Rights” as well as 
Lewis-Beck and Morey, “The French ‘Petit Oui’,” 85. 
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how elite discord and partisanship drive the political process. As political structures 
provide for more restrictions and stopgaps in the ratification process, political variables 
are more likely to be expressed and are more likely to be communicated ferociously. 
Domestic political considerations will thus have the potential to prevent treaty ratification, 
limiting the scope of alliance formation for a given state. Likewise, uneasiness over the 
potential trouble posed by these variables will drive negotiators to insist that alliances are 
organized more explicitly, altering alliance structures. Thus, the theory that alliance 
ratification affects alliance structure and alliance formation fits neatly within the wider 
literature of treaty ratification. See figure 2 for a summary of the theory so far. 
 
FIGURE 2: THE EFFECT OF RATIFICATION STRUCTURE ON  
ALLIANCE FORMATION AND STRUCTURE  
 
 
 
Ratification And Alliance Reliability 
  
 To understand how ratification affects reliability, we must review the two key 
factors that drive alliance reliability. First, as argued by Patricia Weitsman, the balance of 
threat both within and outside of the alliance governs the commitment’s performance. In 
this formulation, states become unreliable partners when the balance of threat within the 
alliance becomes just as great as the balance of threat outside the alliance.62 For example, 
                                                        
 62 Weitsman, 26.  
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the Triple Alliance between Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Germany fell apart because alliance 
members threatened each other’s security and territorial possessions.63 Second, as Robert 
Rothstein claims, the congruence of interests and ideas within an alliance also drives 
reliability. In other words, changing policymaker perception, as well as the shifting 
interests of alliance members, governs alliance policies.64 The ratification of alliance 
agreements moderates both these considerations, mitigating both the balance of threat and 
the calculation of interests and perceptions. 
How does ratification impact the balance of threat between alliance partners? 
Ratification does not affect many mechanisms of balance of threat, namely proximity, 
offensive capability, and aggregate power. Instead, alliance ratification’s impact lies in the 
calculation of offensive intent. Offensive intentions, in Stephen Walt’s original formulation, 
means simply “states that appear aggressive are likely to provoke others to balance against 
them.”65 Alliance ratification stems perceptions of offensive intent in two ways. First, 
because states have already committed formally to the ratification process, they are 
generally perceived as less likely to disavow commitments. Second, alliance ratification 
imposes “audience costs” on violating an alliance. These losses include a “cost” in the 
domestic sphere (the cost of appearing to be an untrustworthy leader) and an international 
“cost” of appearing to be an untrustworthy country. This international cost hurts both a 
                                                        
63 “The reason the states chose to ally were the very factors that inhibited them from coordinating 
goals or implementing joint policy. Italy and Austria-Hungary were historic adversaries, and nothing short of 
Austria relinquishing the Italian provinces still in Hapsburg possession would have resolved the conflicts 
besetting the Triple Alliance…. By 1907, hostility among the members was so high that Germany and Austria 
were compelled to renew their alliance with Italy to prevent Italy’s open defection to the Entente.” Ibid., 96. 
 64 Robert Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, 55. 
 65 Stephen Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” 12.  
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state’s reputation and other states calculation of its offensive intent, doubly discouraging 
states from backtracking on such commitments.66 
Alliance ratification also impacts the second facet of alliance reliability: the 
congruence of alliance partner’s ideas and interests. As suggested above, negotiators from 
states where treaties require ratification will attempt to clearly structure alliances. The 
hope will be that in doing so, domestic audiences will look upon the agreement more 
favorably. Given these specific structures, the cavalcade of future policymakers will 
understand what they have committed to, helping them adjust their policies as needed. 
Likewise, as interests and ideas shift within the alliance, structured alliance will help clarify 
the “plan” going forth – helping enshrine continuity along a changing international 
environment. Finally, a structured treaty may help differentiate what policies are within 
and outside of the alliance’s purview. Such mechanisms can help maintain the alliance 
when other issues threaten to tear it apart. For example, Weitsman describes the interests 
of Austria-Hungary and Germany as becoming “increasingly intertwined” as they worked 
together in the Dual Alliance. Such convergence included common work in “supporting the 
papacy and Catholic interests throughout Europe,” as well as unified balancing against 
Russia and France. Weitsman argues “the institutional aspects of the alliance in this case 
served to deepen the member states’ cooperation over time.”67 Thus, the structuring of 
alliances, driven by alliance ratification, enhances alliance reliability. 
 
                                                        
 66 Although such costs would be applied both towards formal and informal alliances, the cost is 
considerably higher because the state is perceived as having committed more seriously.  
 67 Weisman, 76-77.  
 FIGURE 3: THE EFFECT OF ALLIANCE 
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existence describes whether a country did or did not form an alliance. The case study 
establishes that as domestic restrictions towards ratification increase, the process by which 
a state forms an alliance becomes more rigorous and difficult. Thus, the study evinces 
evidence for the theory that stricter ratification rules limit alliance formation. 
 Meanwhile, the link between alliance ratification and alliance structure, as well as 
between alliance ratification and alliance reliability, will be addressed by a quantitative 
study. Unlike regarding alliance formation, usable data exists for these topics. Likewise, 
applying regressions allows us to view the role of these variables across history and 
geography. This quantitative study shows that some links exist between alliance 
ratification and alliance structure, as well as between ratification and reliability.  
 
QUALITATIVE EVIDENCE 
 
 This section tests the relationship between ratification structures and alliance 
formation using a comparative case study of the League of Nations. Observing the 
ratification of League of Nations membership across states with different institutional 
structures illustrate how countries with different political constructions form alliances 
differently. In particular, when ratification structures are more rigorous, the path towards 
alliance formation will be more wrought. Illustrating this concept helps us understand the 
relationship between domestic variables and international outcomes, as well as the wider 
causation between alliance ratification and alliance reliability. 
 To illustrate that ratification structures drive alliance formation, a case study must 
illustrate a variety of institutional designs, each of which pursues alliance formation 
uniquely.  Cases also need to occur in similar conditions, such as similar proximate threat 
and international rivalries, as well as a similar global balance of power. Likewise, each 
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country’s domestic considerations should be comparable, in that the balance between pro-
ratification and anti-ratification should be analogous. A comparative case study across 
League of Nations ratifications effectively addresses each of these mandates. By studying 
countries ratifying the same treaty around the same time period, numerous variables, 
especially the global balance of power, are generally controlled for. Likewise, by tracing the 
same alliance across countries, we can see the role of similar motivations across different 
political systems. For instance, just as the question of League of Nations membership 
evinced American debate between isolationism and internationalism, it drove German and 
Turkish debates between those who hoped to join the European mainstream and those 
who dissented from it. In each of these countries ratification was rendered uncertain by 
these competing forces.  
At its most basic level, a case study using the League of Nations proves useful 
because there exists a depth of research and public understanding about the case.  Counter-
intuitively, however, the case study also resolves misconceptions about the interwar era. 
For example I build on Bear Braumoeller’s argument that, “American isolationism is a 
myth.”68 Braumoeller contends that the general understanding of why America failed to 
ratify the Treaty of Versailles is deeply flawed – it was institutional structures, not 
domestic preferences, which drove the Senate to reject ratification.69 We may thus 
conclude that much remains misunderstood about American ratification about the League 
of Nations treaty. Likewise, discussions of U.S. ratification have overshadowed the equally 
                                                        
68 Bear Braumoeller, “The Myth of American Isolationism,” Foreign Policy Analysis 6, (2010): 349. 
 69 Braumoeller argues that the failure to ratify the Treaty of Versailles “is a very misleading indicator, 
[of American foreign policy] for two reasons.” First, the treaty had majority support and was actually quite 
close to passing – it failed only because of the Senate’s two-thirds ratification requirement. Second, “the 
considerable majority proved willing to envision engagement with Europe. Only a small group of so-called 
Irreconcilables consistently voted against the treaty in any form… and even they were not opposed to 
internationalism in general…” Bramoeller, 355. 
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interesting narratives of ratification in Germany and Turkey. Accordingly, a comparative 
case study on the League of Nations has appeal both for how much is known and for how 
much remains unknown.   
 Using the League of Nations to examine my theory is not without fault. For example, 
although is will prove useful to outline the ratification process for League of Nations 
membership in France, Britain, and Italy, the cost of war in these countries was so powerful 
as to overwhelm any other calculations – ratification, in short, was driven less by political 
calculations and more by a desperation to stem war deaths.70 Meanwhile, in many cases, 
other aspects of the given treaty (besides those about the League of Nations) drove 
ratifications. For example, those that protested against the Treaty of Versailles in France 
often did so because they believed that the agreement did not sufficiently punish 
Germany.71 Likewise, the few dissenting votes in Britain were, A.J.P. Taylor finds,  
“protesting against the failure to apply self-determination to Ireland.”72 In both these cases, 
there is little reference to the League of Nations as a point of concern. Some of these 
problems are of minimal concern – any ratification process will naturally be co-opted by 
wider foreign or domestic concerns. Meanwhile, by focusing on ratifications that were 
                                                        
 70 For example, by the end of the war, France had sustained 1,390,000 casualties. Amongst the great 
powers, there was simply no will to fight. Adam Hochschild, To End All Wars: A Story of Loyalty and Rebellion 
(New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011): 337-341. This problem has motivated me to also ignore 
ratification procedures in countries at the center of the conflict, such as Poland. Generally, I selected cases 
that were separated from World War I’s epicenter either by time (Germany and Turkey) or geography (the 
United States). 
 71 “Most [French] critics [of ratification], apart from the Socialists, focused on what he [Clemenceau] 
had not obtained in securities and guarantees. The list was imposing. Germany had not been broken up; she 
was not completely disarmed, and the inspection regime was set up under the League of Nations for a fixed 
term, not permanently under the Allied military Command…” It should be noted that some concerns in this 
wider list are not specifically aimed at the treatment of Germany, for example that “Italy had been 
unnecessarily alienated.” Nonetheless, concerns over Germany certainly predominated the docket of 
concerns. See David S. Newhall, Clemenceau: A Life at War (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1991): 462-
463. 
 72 A.J.P. Taylor, English History 1914-1945 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965): 136. 
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peripheral to the center of conflict either by geography (Turkey, United States) or by time 
(Germany), we can somewhat control for war weariness.73  
Finally, some could simply argue that the League of Nations did not represent an 
alliance – that it was a wider inter-governmental organization like the United Nations. 
Nonetheless, the Covenant of the League of Nations required members to consult one 
another before going to war, and ensured that if any member of the organization was 
attacked, that all member states would act to defend it.74 These principles fit neatly into my 
previously-stated definition of alliances as cooperative military agreements designed to 
commit a state to the maintenance, use, or potential use of force. 
 For each case below, I will overview which treaty was relevant to League of Nations 
ratification, as well as the given country’s formal institutional structure. Next, I will discuss 
the domestic constraints and considerations towards ratification. This discussion will 
particularly focus on instances where domestic opposition challenged hopes of ratification. 
Finally, in each case, I will explain how the ratification process drove the pattern of alliance 
formation.  
 
                                                        
 73 There are, of course, other critiques that could be leveled towards my study. For example, I chose 
not to study the Soviet Union, despite the fact that it would have represented an excellent example of a state 
with few ratification requirements. I chose to not use the USSR because it joined the League too late – given 
that the commitment and global conditions were similar across the Turkish, American, and German cases, it 
makes little sense to include Soviet assention.  The political dynamics in 1934 were simply too different to 
compare to those in the 1920’s. After all, by the time the Soviet Union joined the League of Nations, Germany 
had already left the alliance. 
 74 Arnold Tonybee, “What Was Done,” In The Treaty of Versailles and After, ed. George Riddell (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1935) 91-92. 
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Britain, France, and Italy 
 Before going in-depth regarding the German, Turkish, and American cases, I will 
compare the ratification of League of Nations membership in Italy, France, and Britain. 
These cases help establish a baseline with which to compare other, later ratifications.  
In Britain, ratification required a majority vote in Parliament, while in Italy and 
France ratification involved votes in both chambers of the legislature. Although Britain was 
not exactly a two-party system at the time, larger conservative and labor parties 
dominated. Meshed with the British parliamentary system, the UK leaned towards the 
“least restrictive” spectrum of ratification structures. The French system was fractured 
between many political parties, although these smaller factions could generally be 
classified within larger, more cohesive ideological tents. This division and the semi-
presidential system in place meant that France’s ratifications structures were “moderately 
restrictive.” The Italian party system was similarly fractured, and thus also represents an 
example of moderate restrictions.  
 Each country faced resistance to ratification, either from partisan bickering or from 
concerns based on the Treaty of Versailles’ content. Ferdinand Czernin makes a particularly 
evocative claim about British ratification overall: “as the great letdown [the failure of the 
U.S. to ratify the Treaty of Versailles] swept across the country… The English reverted to 
their traditional isolation which they found ‘splendid.’”75 The specter of the upcoming 1918 
election spurred the Liberals, Labor, and Union of Democratic Control to criticize Lloyd 
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George’s management of the Versailles process. 76 British parliamentarians argued that the 
treaty did not sufficiently punish Germany, that Versailles’ self-determination clause was 
too vague, and that the long-term conflict between Germany and France had not been 
managed.77 Academic elites correspondingly condemned the treaty. John Maynard Keynes 
“fired a broadside against reparations” in his Economic Consequences of Peace, where he not 
only condemned the Treaty as risking the ruination of the European economy, but also 
rebuked Britain for fighting such a destructive war in the first place.78  
 Given this protestation, we may have expected to see serious confrontation over 
ratification in the United Kingdom. A well-organized opposition, however, did not 
materialize. In part, this was due to David Lloyd George’s effective statesmanship, 
particularly his speech to Parliament on April 16th.79 As Taylor describes, after the speech, 
“The House of Commons accepted the treaty almost without a murmur. Even Liberal and 
Labour members agreed that the Fourteen Points had been broadly applied. Only four 
members voted against the treaty…”80  
 In Italy’s Foreign and Colonial Policy, 1914-1937, Maxwell Macartney and Paul 
Cremona portray Italy’s frustration, not only with the treaty of Versailles, but also with the 
League of Nations.  They contend, “Italy came out of the Peace Conference of 1919 a 
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dissatisfied nation because, in her view, the pledges undertaken by the Entente Powers in 
the Treaty of London of 1915… were not fulfilled at Versailles.”81 The authors go on to 
claim that “the very birth of the League found Italy unprepared to subscribe 
wholeheartedly to its principles.”82 Such principles included the unclear standing of Italy’s 
and other country’s borders, as well as a general sense that the League favored the status 
quo in terms of French and British domination. Italians also felt betrayed that the Big Four 
did not award them the port of Fiume. The outrage was so great that Italians under “a 
fervently nationalist Italian poet, D’Annunzio” invaded the village themselves.83 Debate 
over Fiume became so heated that Italian negotiator Vittorio Emanuele Orlando “in 
defiance,” left negotiations on April 23rd. He was received back in Italy by “a huge 
ovation.”84 Nonetheless, the political culture of the parliamentary system in Italy between 
1919 and 1922 ensured that “successive cabinets” were able to maintain sufficient 
majorities in parliament to pass their agendas. Put simply, there were no institutional 
constraints (beyond a majority vote) preventing ratification.85 Thus, on January 6th, 1920, 
Italy successfully ratified the Treaty of Versailles. 
 France, like Italy and Britain, left the Paris Peace Conference dissatisfied. Frenchmen 
fretted over the fact that Germany had not been broken up, that reparations depended on 
the League of Nation’s functionality, that the newly-created Eastern European states could 
not possibly balance Russia and Germany, and that Italy had been “unnecessarily 
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alienated.”86 Field Marshall Ferdinand Foch decried what many felt at the time: “This is not 
peace, it is an armistice for twenty years.”87 America’s failure to ratify the treaty put the 
French even more ill at ease – they had envisioned the League of Nations as a substitute for 
an “Anglo-American guarantee pact.” Without U.S. support, the League represented a 
meaningless security guarantees.88 Nonetheless, “France’s ultimate ratification of the 
Treaty of Versailles was never seriously in doubt. The government won a procedural 
motion, 262 to 188 (30 September), and the bill itself passed by a vote of 372 to 53 in the 
Chamber (2 October) and unanimously in the Senate (11 October).”89 This victory 
represented both French acceptance that they could not achieve a better deal and the 
efforts of George Clemenceau (Newhall writes that the Prime Minister’s speeches in favor 
of ratification were “among his most elevated and self-revealing.”). Ratification also 
illustrated the fact that the institutional design of France, like Britain, allowed the Prime 
Minister to drive ratification forward with ease. 
 These cases are enlightening even if calculations were in part corrupted by a desire 
to end the war. It is typically argued that ratification failed in the U.S. because there was a 
uniquely motivated resistance. However, in studying Britain, Italian, and French politics, 
we can see that many countries experienced serious resistance to joining the League of 
Nations and ratifying the Versailles accord. Thus, I would argue that alongside postwar 
exhaustion there was a latent variable driving ascendance into the League of Nations– the 
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permissive ratification structure in Britain, and the modestly open ratification rules in 
France and Italy. Nonetheless, these cases all take place close (both geographically and 
temporally) to the end of World War I, where the impetus for ratification partially lay in the 
desperation to stem losses. Thus, let us look elsewhere to study in-depth the link between 
ratification and alliance formation. 
  
Germany 
 
 Germany’s entrance to the League of Nations occurred not by its ratification of the 
Treaty of Versailles, but instead by its acceptance of the Treaty of Locarno, signed in 
October 1925. The Treaty of Locarno, according to R.B. Mowat, was meant to “solve the 
tremendous problems of European security after five years of failure.”90 Gustav 
Stresemann, the German Foreign Minister, originally called for the Locarno Conference to 
settle “questions of disarmament and evacuation” between France and Germany.91 He also 
hoped to establish wider “nonaggression, arbitration, and military agreements between 
‘those powers interested in the Rhine.”92 The final treaty would not only attempt to 
enshrine peace on the European continent, but would also act as the mechanism for 
Germany’s membership to the League of Nations. 
                                                        
 90 R.B., A History of European Diplomacy 1914-1925, (New York: Longmans Green & Co., 1927): 311. 
91 “The present acute question of disarmament and evacuation are frequently considered in France 
from the standpoint of security against possible aggressive intentions on the part of Germany. For that reason 
it would probably be easier to find a solution for them if they were combined with an agreement of a general 
nature, the object of which would be to secure peace between Germany and France… She [Germany] is 
anxious to see the problems arising between her and France dealt with by no other method than that of 
friendly understanding, and is accordingly interested, for her part, in the establishment of a special treaty 
foundation for such a peaceful understanding.” See Edgar Vincent D’Abernon, An Ambassador of Peace; Pages 
from the Diary of Viscount D’Abernon, (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran & Company, 1931): 276.  
 92 John Jacobson, Locarno Diplomacy: Germany and The West, 1925-1929, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1972): 4.  
 38
Locarno settled German-French relations in a number of ways. First, Germany 
officially recognized the Western border imposed upon it by the Treaty of Versailles. Under 
this arrangement, Germany would posses the Rhineland (at the time it was under French 
occupation) and France would posses Alsace-Lorraine. The border would be maintained by 
a defensive pact between Germany, France, Great Britain, Belgium, and Italy. Second, 
France and Germany renounced war as a tool of statecraft “and bound themselves to settle 
all disputes by arbitration.”93 Third, Germany’s Eastern border was left unspecified and up 
for future arbitration.94 The Treaty did not formally mention Germany’s membership in the 
League of Nations, but it was an understood principle of the document that Germany would 
join the alliance and would be given veto privileges. Germany officially joined the League a 
year after Locarno’s ratification, in September 1926.95  
 The Weimar Republic’s structure required a majority vote to ratify treaties of 
alliance. However, unlike Britain, Italy, and France, Germany faced an extremely divided 
and disparate multiparty system. Numerous parties ran and successfully earned seats in 
the National Assembly and the Reichstag (the legislature after 1919). The median 
percentage of vote won by a political party between 1919 and 1924 was only 6 percent, 
and the maximum earned by any party after 1919 was only 26 percent.96 Such conditions 
forced complex coalition politics upon the country, creating numerous veto players to 
arrest ratification. These conditions were made even more problematic due to the presence 
(and relative electoral success) of the nationalist German National People’s Party  
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(Deutschnationale Volkspartei [DVNP]). Eberhard Kolb argues, “The DNVP considered itself 
as an anti-parliamentarian part of ‘integration’…”97 Considering that the DNVP represented 
a significant bloc in parliament, earning 103 seats in the 1924 parliament, it is to no 
surprise that their presence represented not only a potential veto, but also a very likely 
one. See figure 4.   
 Despite the fact that Foreign Minister (and for a while in 1923, Chancellor) 
Stresemann had achieved a diplomatic coup, the treaty faced significant resistance back at 
home. Most importantly, the DNVP, according to Hans Mommsen, “were determined to 
sabotage the security pact.” They and other nationalist parties “sharply criticized the treaty 
and attacked the renunciation of Alsace-Lorraine and Germany’s entry into the League of 
Nations…”98 This immediately imperiled the treaty, given that the DNVP possessed 103 out 
of 493 seats in the Reichstag.99  
 
FIGURE 4: PERCENT VOTE WON IN REICH ELECTIONS, 1919-1924100 
Year DNVP NSDAP W. Partei D.H.P. Landbund DVP Zentrum BVP DDP SPD USPD KPD Other 
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 The DNVP proved difficult to negotiate with for two reasons. One, the party lacked 
internal cohesion, so driving commitments from one sector of the party did little to 
                                                        
 97 Ibid., 71. 
 98 Hans Mommsen, The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1996): 207. 
 99 Ibid., 203. See also Kolb, 224. 
 100 Ibid., 224. 
 40
guarantee votes at the final ratification. Two, Mommsen notes that “with the active support 
of Alfred Hugenberg and his press empire, the party’s local and regional organizations 
brought increasingly heavy pressure to bear upon the NVP party leadership [to oppose the 
treaty].”101 These difficulties meant that Stresemann had to spend many months working 
with both rival parties and foreign negotiators before Locarno could be approved. In the 
end, Germany ratified Locarno, but the ratification brought down the parliamentary 
government (the DNVP left the governing coalition over Locarno’s ratification). The vote 
itself was highly partisan, with the SPD, Centre, DVP, DDP and BVP in favor and the DNVP, 
Völksche Partei, KPD, and Wietschaftspartei against – a vote of 300 to 174.102 
 Given the fact that Locarno survived German ratification, why does it remain an 
interesting case? First, it illustrates how multiparty systems impose difficulties towards 
alliance formation – even if Locarno passed, it came with the fall of the government, and 
only occurred after many months of negotiation. Second, it continues to demonstrate that 
U.S. ratification of the Treaty of Versailles was not unique in regards to experiencing 
domestic resistance – Germany in many ways faced more resistance towards ratification 
than America due to the DNVP’s large parliamentary contingency. Third, it provides a 
vessel of comparison between ratification in the U.S. and ratification in France and Italy. 
Whereas ratification structures were very similar to those in France and Italy, Germany’s 
party system made ratification more rigorous, like in the United States. Hence, the German 
case is interesting because it illustrates the variety of ways states ratify, the varying rigors 
that ratification faces, and thus the varying difficulties in forming alliances. 
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The United States  
 Unlike the other two case studies, the United State’s decision to join the League of 
Nations was oriented around the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles.  As stated before, 
the League represented a defensive alliance whereby each member state would protect the 
others from invasion, both from members and non-members of the League. The alliance 
also worked as an entente – Article 11, for example “gave each Member [of the League] the 
right to call upon the Council and Assembly to discuss any serious differences…”103 
Alongside the Treaty of Versailles, the League represented an opportunity for the United 
States to exercise a greater role on the international stage, for the first time deeply 
embedding itself in Europe’s alliance system.   
 Ratification, famously, did not go as hoped. President Woodrow Wilson knew that 
ratification would prove difficult – from the start of the war a faction of anti-international 
Senators, known as “irreconcilables,” opposed most sorts of international participation by 
the U.S.104 However, as Bear Braumoeller argues, a majority of American elites could and 
did envision some role of the U.S. in international affairs (and international organizations): 
The considerable majority [of Americans] proved willing to envision 
engagement with Europe. Only a small group of so-called Irreconcilables 
consistently voted against the Treaty in any form, and even they were not 
opposed to internationalism in general – a fact evidenced by the support of 
some for an immediate Anglo-American defensive treaty with France and 
other for an international judiciary to keep the peace.105 
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Braumoeller effectively illustrates the popularity of the League of Nations in America. For 
example, he points to a survey of 174 newspapers and 35 magazines in which a majority of 
Americans favored membership in the League.106 American elite and popular resistance to 
ratification, then, cannot be characterized as any harsher than similar movements in 
Germany, Britain, and, as I will show soon, Turkey.  
 Thus the political structure of the American government, not its ideological 
structure, wrecked hopes for ratification. The Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
represented the first roadblock to ratification. The committee not only possessed the 
ability to delay ratification, but also had been recently staffed by Lodge with numerous 
“irreconcilables.” These senators used their capacity to delay ratification so as to help 
create the time for opposition to the Treaty of Versailles to mobilize. According to 
Ferdinand Czernin, “two weeks were consumed by having the Treaty read aloud, paragraph 
by paragraph, while six weeks were devoted to public hearings.”107 These public hearings 
were designed to galvanize sentiments against Wilson and the internationalists – 
negotiators and major diplomats were “subject to merciless cross-examination,” in an 
attempt to make them confess Versailles’ sins.108 
 As resistance grew, Lodge proposed a series of reservations to the Treaty – legal 
mechanisms that could have been passed alongside ratification to clarify America’s position 
on League membership. These reservations enshrined the role of Congress in approving 
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League protocols, and protected the right of the U.S. to abstain from League policies.109 
Lodge’s reservations were incorporated into the Treaty by a vote of 81 to 13. In response, 
ratification was prevented by a vote of 39 for to 55 against. Wilson encouraged his 
Democrat allies to vote against it, insisting the reservations were unacceptable. Thus, the 
coalition that defeated the treaty represented a coalition of “Wilsonian Democrats, 
moderates, and irreconcilables.”110 After some discussion and negotiation, a later vote 
brought the balance to 49 yeas and 35 nays, a vote that surpassed the majority needed (48) 
but fell short of the two-thirds vote needed.111  
 Overall, then, the United States failed to ratify Wilson’s brainchild not due to 
ideological divisions, but to an institutional design that empowered the opposition to 
prevent ratification. In fact, opposition to ratification was quite similar to opposition in 
Britain, Italy, France, and Germany, and in many ways was less powerful. Opponents to 
American ratification, for example, did not belong to a party bent on regime change 
(Germany’s DNVP), nor did they form bands and invade nearby fishing villages (Italy’s 
ultranationalists). Nonetheless, the presence of a restrictive committee structure, the 
opportunity to tack on reservations, and the influence of a two-thirds vote rule ensured 
that the United States would neither ratify the Treaty of Versailles nor join the League of 
Nations. 
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Turkey  
 Turkey’s membership to the League of Nations arose via the Treaty of Lausanne, 
which was negotiated between Greece, Turkey, Britain, France, the United States, Romania, 
and Yugoslavia starting in the fall of 1922.112 The Treaty was designed to stabilize post-war 
border conflicts in Turkey and the Balkans, given continued warring between the Greeks 
and Turks over the Dardanelles.113 According to Salahi Sonyel, just as the Treaty of Locarno 
ushered Germany back into the club of great powers, the Treaty of Lausanne, “was an 
epilogue of a defeated and apparently shattered nation which rose from its ruins… Turkey 
now stood before the whole world ‘free from foreign entanglement,’ independent and 
sovereign within her national boundaries.”114 
 The Treaty’s major provisions re-oriented the Turkish boundaries, including 
clarification of its borders with Syria, Bulgaria, Iraq, and Greece. These stipulations were 
typically in Turkey’s favor, such as granting it an enclave in Greece around Karagach. The 
Treaty also settled Turkey’s reparations, cancelling the payments before they had even 
begun.115 Numerous other concerns were settled, such as the treatment of minorities in 
Turkey (such concerns would be referred to the League of Nations, the annexation by 
Britain of Cyprus, and the state of Ottoman public debt.116 Finally, the treaty ensured that 
Turkey would attain membership in the League of Nations. 
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 Turkey’s political structures at the time of ratification were amorphous and in 
transition. The Constitution of 1923 had been ratified by the Grand National Assembly, but 
would not become the law of the land until 1924. However, I would argue that in 1924, two 
veto players existed. First, there was President Mustafa Kemal, whose power was not only 
institutional, but also social, as he was perceived as “the hero of the war of liberation.”117 As 
described below, Kemal would use this social position, as well as his political resources, to 
convert his social influence into greater informal political power. Second, there was the 
Grand National Assembly, which held the institutional authority to ratify. Importantly, as a 
bastion of anti-Kemalist elites, it represented a veto from the other half of the country – the 
conservatives and Islamists who dreamed of a very different Turkey. The exact space 
between these two institutions and ideologies was still very much in development. As a 
“shrewd observer” argued in November 1924: 
The monarchy and the Caliphate could be abolished by an act of parliament. 
But in order to be completely safe from the threat of these institutions it 
would be necessary to struggle for many years against the ideas and 
activities which gave them strength.118 
 
Accordingly, many elites at the time probably saw the ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne 
as an opportunity to stake out the borders of modern Turkish society. Ratification of the 
treaty, in short, was a weapon by which the two competing factions (and institutions) could 
win the conflict over Turkey’s future.  
 Resistance to Lausanne’s ratification sprung both from strategic and political 
considerations. Strategically, a major concern was that that the Treaty of Lausanne 
wrecked Turko-Soviet relations. Turkey and the Soviet Union had been initially close after 
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World War I, signing a Treaty and National Pact some years before Lausanne. The 
negotiations in 1923 changed all that – by internationalizing the Straits (instead of leaving 
it to Russian and Turkish ships only), Turkey distressed one of its major interwar 
partners.119 These concerns muted the support of some secularists, many of whom had 
visited Russia and looked to their revolution as a model of modernization.120 
 The negotiating at Lausanne also upset conservatives, who already opposed the 
Treaty in the principle of blocking Kemal’s agenda. The surrendering of Mosul to the British 
protectorate was a national embarrassment, and greatly upset the Grand National 
Assembly, which had insisted on keeping the city.121 The opposition blamed İsmet İnönü, 
the primary negotiator at Lausanne, for allegedly betraying Turkish ideals. During the 
ratification debate, this opposition defied Kemal and İsmet, as well as parliamentary 
decorum, by braying out protestations.122 Eventually, a vote of confidence was taken, which 
Kinross notes “showed less than a two-to-one majority for Kemal, while a large number of 
abstentions showed a great gulf which now existed between Parliament and government. It 
was virtually a vote of no confidence.”123 It seemed as if the Treaty of Lausanne had failed 
ratification.  
 If ratification had actually died here, then Turkey would represent a counter-
argument to my theory – an example of a state with few requirements failing to ratify an 
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extremely valuable strategic treaty. Kemal, however, dissolved parliament and ensured 
that the next attempt at ratification would proceed effortlessly. In part, this was done 
legitimately – Kemal spent the next months actively campaigning for the People Party’s 
victory.124 Kemal also actively discouraged opposition candidates from seeking or 
obtaining office. At one point, Kemal was even accused of murdering a key rival, Ali Shükrü, 
although he was later acquitted.125 Thus, through tireless campaigning and intimidation, 
Kemal ensured that the parliament of 1923 would no longer act as a veto player. The next 
Grand National Assembly was packed with pro-Kemalist supporters, and the treaty passed 
through ratification with no more resistance.  
Thus, to secure his country’s alliance with Western powers, Kemal had shifted his 
country’s ratification structure from moderate-to-low restrictions, to only one restriction – 
that his word would be law. Kemal’s actions illustrate both the dynamism of formal and 
informal political structures and the ways in which ratification structures are constituted. 
Overall, then, the narrative of Turkish ratification is one of transitional, pseudo-formal 
institutions creating an unclear process of ratification. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 This case study illustrates overall that as ratification restrictions increase, it 
becomes more difficult to form alliances. Whereas loud and active resistance in Britain and 
Turkey were seamlessly silenced, protestation in the United States and Germany brought 
down the government and, in one case, prevented the alliance from being formed. 
Importantly, too, we see that the United States is a unique case not because of its fierce 
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 domestic opposition to ratification, but instead because of its institutional d
Ratification, thus, may always face opposition, but it is the institutional structure, not the 
ideology of a few elites, that ends up driving the historical narrative of treaty ratification.  
 
 
FIGURE 5: RATIFICATION
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end dates, its structural elements, and its termination. The data aspires to describe all 
regions between the dates of 1815 to 2003. It was merged with data from two other 
sources – Weitsman and Shambaugh’s “International Systems, Domestic Structures and 
Risk,” as well as the Polity dataset.127 Weitsman and Shambaugh’s coding predominately 
covers the years of 1816 to 1992, although data for at least one variable continues to 1994. 
Meanwhile, Polity IV data was available between 1800 and 2012. Since Weitsman and 
Shambaugh’s and Polity’s data were added to ATOP, the dataset continues to contain 
information from 1815 to 2003. Nonetheless, many controls are only effectively used on 
cases occurring between 1816 and 1992.128 
 For both sets of models, “ESTMODE” was the independent variable. ESTMODE is 
dummy variable from ATOP coded “1” if “the written document establishing the alliance is 
a formal treaty requiring domestic ratification.”129 This variable clearly gets at the question 
of ratification-versus-no-ratification, but is limited by its small scale.  Nevertheless, it 
provides a clear, if simplified picture of alliance ratification.130 
 
                                                        
 127 See Patricia Weitsman and George Shambaugh, “International Systems, Domestic Structures, and 
Risk,” Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 3 (2002): 289-312 and Monty Marshall, Ted Gurr, and Keith Jaggers, 
Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2012 Dataset Users’ Manual, 2013. 
 128 Data was manually recoded between the sets. Since Weitsman and Shambaugh’s data only 
describes between 1816 and 1993/1994, and only pertains to certain country codes, the final dataset is 
incomplete. In cases where alliances were formed within two months of 1816 (i.e. November 1815) or 1994 
(i.e. February 1993). Weitsman and Shambaugh’s data also did not code for every member present in the 
ATOP dataset. Thus, SYSCH and CON were re-coded for all member-years possible, as these were global 
variables irrespective of a given country’s conditions. Furthermore, Polity IV data was used in recoding the 
DEM variable. This recoding was meant to expand the variable’s data points beyond the countries and the 
times studied in Weitsman and Shambaugh’s article.  
 129 Leeds, Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) Codebook, 16. 
 130 Ideally, a dataset would exist that would describe a state’s structure for the ratification of alliance 
agreements, or at least the ratification of treaties. Given the fact that this doesn’t exist, and since data on the 
role of veto players (a useful proxy) is hard to come by, it makes sense to resort to variables that describe the 
state of the treaty’s ratification (ESTMODE). 
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Alliance Ratification & Alliance Structure: First Cuts131 
 Logit models were used to test the relationship between ratification and alliance 
structures. The independent variable ESTMODE was compared with four dependent 
variables describing alliance structure. The selected dependent variables would alter states 
balance-of-threat calculations, altering alliance reliability considerations. Such variables 
would also incur some sort of domestic interest. For example, specified military 
contribution levels could perhaps raise questions of guns-versus-butter in domestic 
debates. Each of the following dependent variables is a dummy variable describing a 
structural element of the alliance treaty: “DIVGAINS,” measuring any discussion of the 
division of future gains from the conflict, “CONTRIB,” measuring specific material 
contributions or the division of costs within the alliance, and “CONSUL,” measuring 
promises to consult alliance members in moments of inter-state militarized crises. Finally, 
MILAID, originally describing various forms of military aid granted in treaties, was recoded 
as a dummy variable where “0” indicated no delineation of military and “1” indicated the 
provision of aid. See figure 6 below for descriptive statistics on these variables.  
 Two concepts are visible in the above data. First, nearly eighty percent of treaties 
from 1815 to 2003 were ratified. Perhaps this is because regimes that don’t have treaty 
ratification mechanisms simply don’t make formal treaties, instead relying on 
understandings between autocrats. Another potential explanation is that a norm of treaty 
ratification has arisen, and even in states with questionable regime structures, ratification 
of some sort still occurs.  Second, treaties rarely are structured towards the division of 
                                                        
 131 In this model, data from Weitsman and Shambaugh, as well as from Polity, was correlated with the 
year the alliance was entered into.  
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gains, specified military contribution levels, or the provision of military aid. Only structures 
towards crisis consulting are particularly common.  
 
FIGURE 6: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: RATIFICATION AND ALLIANCE STRUCTURE 
 
 
Alliance 
Ratified Division Gains Contrib. Levels Crisis Consulting Military Aid 
Yes 1297 63 244 1126 193 
No 346 1549 1371 521 1429 
Total 1643 1612 1615 1647 1622 
   
 Controls were constructed from all three datasets. First, this thesis uses ATOP’s 
dummy variable, “WARTIME,” which measures whether any member state was at war 
when the alliance was formed. Alliances organized in war are likely to be more conflict-
oriented, and may be based more on unofficial, heat-of-the moment understandings. 
“Statethreat” and “conmen” were also taken from ATOP. The former was recoded from 
ATOP’s variable “STATTHR1” as a dummy variable, indicating a “0” if the treaty does not 
mention a specific state as a threat, and a “1” if a specific threat is mentioned. Alliances 
designed to combat a specific threat are likely to be more defensive in nature, and thus may 
affect structural variables. Finally, “conmen” is a dummy variable coded as “1” if “the 
alliance agreement mentions unresolved conflicts among the members on specific issues 
that are deferred to later resolution.”132 Presumably, allies with unresolved tensions may 
seek structured alliances aimed to ensure reliability. 
                                                        
 132 Leeds, Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) Codebook, 46. 
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Meanwhile, three controls were taken from the Weitsman and Shambaugh dataset – 
DEMCH, CAP, and SYSCH. “DEMCH” measures “the aggregate estimate of change in regime 
type,” measured by the change in a country’s polity score over the course of a year. 
Alliances would likely be structured in instances of regime change, so as to establish 
guiding principles for whomever would lead the country next. “CAP” describes a state’s 
position in the global power hierarchy using data from the Correlates of War composite 
national capabilities index. Finally, “SYSCH” is a dummy variable defining whether systemic 
shifts in hegemony were occurring in the year of alliance formation. Both these variables, 
which define aspects of international power distribution and conflict proclivity, would alter 
how states would perceive alliance membership and structure.  
 
Models A and B: Division of Gains and Specified Military Contribution 
Three models were designed to test the relationship between ratification and 
structure. The first model uses all controls mentioned above. The second model removes 
measures of relative power and regime change, as these variables were not generalized 
across all cases. Finally, the third model only uses ATOP variables. 
Treaty ratification does not drive the division of gains in a statistically significant 
way. Perhaps, then, negotiators worry that domestic opposition will attack specified 
divisions of gains as insufficient, no matter how much is actually given. Thus, diplomats are 
not drawn to specifying the division of gains. Wartime alliances, meanwhile, are 
statistically significant in promoting the division of gains. Such alliances, naturally taking 
place in case of military struggles, will likely attempt some conception of the post-war 
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world to prevent future conflict and incentivize alliance member action. The fact that this 
variable was only statistically significant in two out of three models, and was only 
significant at the 0.1 level, however, indicates that the drive to specify gains is not 
particularly strong. Meanwhile, specified threats are statistically significant towards the 
division of gains, meaning that like wartime alliances, alliances that are targeted against a 
particular enemy are likely to incentivize cooperation via specifically designated rewards. 
Notably, then, systemic change does not correlate with the division of gains, perhaps 
because actors cannot conceive of what the new change in power will bring. 
 Finally, previous disputes, regime change, and relative capacity do not impact the 
division of gains in a treaty in a statistically significant way. Presumably, then, states with 
greater relative capacities form treaties similarly to states with lower capabilities. The 
other two considerations here are interesting. One would think that when states with 
policy disputes ally together, or when member states are engaging in regime transitions, 
clearly-spelled out treaties would be a advisable. Perhaps the division of gains simply is not 
the ideal structure to incentivize treaty maintenance. This would make sense, given that 
only about four percent of treaties seem to mention the mechanism. 
 In the mean time, treaty ratification correlates with specified contributions in a 
statistically significant way.133 We may thus intuit that negotiators constitute contribution 
levels to incentivize both domestic and international actors. For domestic actors, specified 
contribution levels may spell out the maximum amount of troops or money they will be 
                                                        
 133 Although ratification was not statistically significant in the first model, the fact that it is significant 
at .05 level in Model II and the .001 level in Model III is evidence towards the fact that a real trend is being 
discovered. Model II and Model III also have larger N’s, granting them greater verisimilitude.  
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required to give, resolving anxiety towards potentially infinite contributions. Meanwhile, 
specified contributions are appealing at the international level because they indicate a 
minimum each state will be expected to contribute, helping resolve free rider problems.  
 
FIGURE 7: LOGIT REGRESSION OF TREATY RATIFICATION, DIVISION OF GAINS, AND 
CONTRIBUTION LEVELS 
 
 Division of Gains Contribution Levels 
 Model Ia Model IIa Model IIIa Model Ib Model IIa Model IIIa 
       
TREATY 
___RATIFICATION 
-0.421 
(0.28) 
0.238 
(0.30) 
0.512 
(0.31) 
0.027 
(0.32) 
0.674** 
(0.25) 
0.654*** 
(0.25) 
       
WARTIME 
___ALLIANCE 
1.037* 
(0.43) 
0.869* 
(0.37) 
0.603 
(0.38) 
0.474 
(0.31) 
-0.712 
(0.22) 
-0.12 
(0.19) 
       
SPECIFIED THREAT 3.348*** 
(0.56) 
3.852*** 
(0.60) 
4.135*** 
(0.63) 
0.157 
(0.30) 
-2.009 
(0.18) 
-0.097 
(0.18) 
       
PREVIOUS DISPUTE 1.299 
(1.28) 
0.757 
(1.06) 
0.750 
(1.05) 
--
A 
0.810 
(0.68) 
-1.020 
(0.71) 
       
REGIME CHANGE 0.0549 
(0.82) 
  0.104 
(0.89) 
  
       
RELATIVE 
CAPACITY 
2.013 
(1.86) 
  0.840 
(2.31) 
  
       
SYSTEMIC CHANGE -0.757** 
(0.25) 
-0.778* 
(0.32) 
 -0.915*** 
(0.22) 
-0.716*** 
(0.14) 
 
       
CONSTANT -4.678*** 
(0.49) 
-5.600*** 
(0.57) 
-6.293*** 
(0.68) 
-1.973*** 
(0.25) 
-1.905*** 
(0.19) 
-2.222*** 
(0.20) 
          
N 764 1367 1605 751 1367 1605 
Robust standard errors in the parentheses 
***=p<0.01 **=p,0.05 *=p<0.01 
In case “A”, the model reported that there was too much colinearity to test the given variable. Such errors may occur when models have a large 
number of variables, especially when many of them are dummy variables. 
 
Cells report parameters estimated via clustering along Correlates of War Country Codes.  Dependent variables describe either if the treaty specifies 
a division of military gains or specifies military contribution levels. Negatively signed coefficients are associated with a lack of these factors. 
  
For an example of the appeal of contribution levels, imagine a treaty of alliance 
where each member explicitly is told to contribute two percent of their domestic budget to 
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alliance-based military spending. For domestic audiences, the comfort will be in knowing 
this spending will hover around that two percent, leaving plenty left in state coffers for 
other priorities. Meanwhile, other states in the alliance will approve of the consistency of 
the commitment – assuming members uphold their part of the bargain, they can be 
confident in consistent spending on the commitment. Such conditions could promote 
greater alliance reliability – with specifications on contributions, the members are tied 
more closely together, increasing the costs of dissolving the alliance and preventing 
potential management disputes over alliance maintenance.  
 Most controls were not statistically significant towards specified contributions. 
Relative capacity may not be able to explain commitment levels because what matters is 
the constellation of states in the alliance and their ratios of relative powers, not the exact 
powers of a single state. Simultaneously, specified threat and wartime alliances may not 
explain specified contributions, as the exact nature of threats and wars may vary. In some 
conflicts and towards some threats, it may make sense to plan contribution levels. In other 
instances, the threat may already be at the door, and there is no time left to plan 
commitments.134 
 Finally, states with previous disputes are not statistically likely to form treaties with 
explicit contribution structures. Once again, a number of rational paths may lead us to this 
consideration. Perhaps allies in policy conflicts know that the alliance will prove 
ephemeral, and thus sometimes balk at the idea of concrete commitments. Or perhaps 
conflicting allies join together in the hopes of, counter intuitively, resolving conflicts 
                                                        
 134 Such moments where the threat is at the door may include instances of systemic change, 
explaining why “SYSCH” is statistically significant in the negative direction. 
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between them by committing to mutual protection. In such instances, specified 
contribution levels may often be a bridge too far towards establishing cordial relations.  
 Overall, then, considerations driving alliance structure appear to be less clear-cut 
than initially expected. Nonetheless, it can be discerned that ratification does not appear to 
promote the explicit division of gains. Meanwhile, ratification appears influential in driving 
specified contribution levels, a variable that has the potential to increase alliance reliability. 
 
Models C and D: Crisis Consultation and Military Aid 
 The following models operate in the same way as above, with the same controls, and 
the same independent variables, as well as the same systems for each three models. 
However, in this case, the dependent variables are the structuring of crisis consultation and 
the promising of military aid.  See figure 8 below.   
Treaty ratification does not affect either dependent variable as expected. In regards 
to crisis consulting, ratification is only positively related and statistically significant in one 
of three models. Thus, we cannot fully conclude that ratification drives provisions of crisis 
consulting, nor can we fully reject the idea. Perhaps domestic audiences are generally 
apathetic towards this, a more evanescent structure. Alternately, crisis consulting may 
convince domestic audiences that the commitment has robustly tied alliance members 
together. Meanwhile, ratification negatively correlates with the provision of military aid at 
the .001 level. In other words, treaties that are ratified are less likely to provide for the 
sharing of military aid. This is not so remarkable – although military aid in some cases may 
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be low in cost and high in value, domestic actors are likely to view such provisions as an 
impetus for protest. Domestic actors may be particularly leery of supplying other states the 
hard-won hardware and technological advances developed by scientists at home. They may 
also argue that such mechanisms are simply too costly. Finally, the problem may originate 
from the fact that the military aid dummy variable is a blunt measurement – measuring 
neither who receives the aid, how much aid is provide, nor what sort of aid it is. Together, 
theoretic and data-based problems could be severely impeding the link between 
ratification and structure.    
 How did other variables fare in driving the provision of military aid or crisis 
consulting? Specified threats correlate negatively both with crisis consulting and military 
aid. Hence, when states form alliances to combat a threat, they may already preparing for 
do-or-die conflicts. They will thus likely see the provision of military aid or crisis consulting 
is meaningless. The crisis is at hand, and military aid will be embodied in the countries 
uniting militarily for each other’s survival.  
 Other variables, however, are given to a less one-sided analysis. Wartime alliances, 
for example, make crisis consulting less likely – the crisis, again, is already at hand. 
Nonetheless, wartime alliances are likely to promote provisions on military aid. This isn’t 
particularly surprising –alliances engaging in conflict wish to support partners in the field.  
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FIGURE 8: LOGIT REGRESSION OF TREATY RATIFICATION, CRISIS CONSULTATION, AND 
MILTARY AID 
 
 Crisis Consulting Military Aid
A 
 Model Ic Model IIc Model IIIc Model Id Model IId Model IIId 
             
TREATY 
___RATIFICATION 
 0.062 
(0.30) 
 0.011 
(0.28) 
0.468 ** 
(0.19) 
 -1.514*** 
(0.31) 
 -1.502*** 
(0.25) 
 -1.036*** 
(0.23) 
             
WARTIME 
___ALLIANCE 
 -0.689** 
(0.32) 
 -0.794** 
(0.33) 
 -0.672*** 
(0.20) 
 1.163** 
(0.39) 
 1.15*** 
(0.36) 
 0.207 
(0.20) 
             
SPECIFIED THREAT  -0.728** 
(0.24) 
-0.867 *** 
(0.22) 
-1.286*** 
(0.18) 
 -0.728** 
(0.37) 
 -0.863** 
(0.35) 
 -0.890*** 
(0.25) 
             
PREVIOUS DISPUTE  0.170 
(0.63) 
 -0.034 
(0.58) 
 -0.731 
(0.46) 
    
             
REGIME CHANGE  0.012 
(0.05) 
     0.030 
(0.07) 
    
             
RELATIVE 
CAPACITY 
 0.106 
(1.12) 
 0.606 
(0.58) 
  0.332 
(1.33)  
 0.151 
(1.05) 
   
             
SYSTEMIC CHANGE 0.344* 
(0.18) 
 0.265 
(0.17) 
   0.121 
(0.46) 
 -0.133 
(0.42) 
  
             
CONSTANT  0.806*** 
(0.24) 
 0.834*** 
(0.22) 
0.930*** 
(0.15) 
 -1.307*** 
(0.48) 
 -1.203** 
(0.41) 
 -1.148*** 
(0.23) 
              
N  764  860  1605  764  844 1573 
Robust standard errors in the parentheses 
***=p<0.01 **=p,0.05 *=p<0.01 
In models under “A”, the model reported that there was too much colinearity to test the given variable. Such errors may occur when models have a 
large number of variables, especially when many of them are dummy variables. 
 
Cells report parameters estimated via clustering along Correlates of War Country Codes.  Dependent variables describe either if the treaty specifies 
planning for crisis consulting or specifies military aid. Negatively signed coefficients are associated with a lack of these factors. 
 
 Finally, systemic change, relative capacity, previous disputes, and regime change do 
not effectively explain crisis consulting or military aid. Systemic change was significant in 
one of four models, but only at the 0.1 level. This suggests that when the system is facing a 
new hegemon, states are not particularly driven towards or against the provision of 
military aid or consultation. The use of these structures may depend on how conflict-
oriented the change in hegemony is – violent changes in hegemony would promote crisis 
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consulting and military aid, while more peaceable transitions would not. Meanwhile, 
relative capacity was not statistically significant in any of the four models where it 
appeared. We may thus hypothesize that what matters in terms of structure is the dyadic 
relation between alliance members, not the power of a single member. Finally, regime 
change and previous disputes were not statistically significant in any one model. 
Presumably, then, neither t-1 changes in regime structures nor policy conflicts drive 
specific military considerations.  
 There are two ways to interpret these results. First, it could be argued that 
ratification should have the same impact on all alliance structures. In this case, when 
ratification does not correlate with alliance structure, we can simply excuse the data for 
being problematic. Second, one could claim that each aspect of alliance structure has its 
own domestic logic, making it either more or less palatable in cases of alliance ratification. 
In this formulation, ratification still may affect reliability through structures. However, in 
this new formulation, only specific structures link the effects of ratification with those of 
reliability.  This thesis accepts this explanation, both for the fact that it responds effectively 
with the data on hand and promotes an interesting and logical concept. 
 
Alliance Ratification & Alliance Reliability135  
 Ordered logit models were used to test the relationship between ratification and 
reliability. The independent variable “ESTMODE” was compared with a recoded dependent 
variable “TERMIN.” The variable “TERMIN” was based on (ATOP’s “TERMCAUS”) is 
                                                        
 135 When the alliance was recoded as still active in 2003, the Polity score for 2003 was used.  
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described below in figure 9. “TERMIN” can take five values, organized by the ferocity by 
which the alliance collapsed. See figure 10 below for a breakdown of TERMIN’s values. 
 From looking at figure 9, we can see that alliances are reliable, but not remarkably 
so. About fifty-three percent of alliances are either still active or end after their mission is 
fulfilled. Although this is a majority ofcass, a notable number of alliances end because of 
policy disputes either within or outside of the alliance (249 cases), because provisions are 
ignored or violated (130 cases) or because allies attack one another (65 cases).  
 
FIGURE 9: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: ALLIANCE RELIABILITY136 
 
 Number 
Alliance Still Active 594 
Replaced By New Agreement 337 
Loss of Political Independence 90 
Provisions Fulfilled 180 
Departure – Unrelated Policy Dispute  240 
Departure – Alliance Policy Dispute  9 
Members Attacked One Another 65 
Provisions Ignored/War Lost 61 
Provision Violated 69 
Total 1462 
 
FIGURE 10: ORDINAL VALUES OF THE ALLIANCE TERMINATION (TERMIN) VARIABLE 
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 136 Based on TERMIN, the ATOP variable describing alliance termination before being re-coded as an 
ordinal variable. ESTMODE’s distribution is the same in this model as before.  
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 Controls used in the ologit model overlap with controls used in the above logit 
models: the variables for wartime alliance, previous disputes, and specified threats were 
used again. New controls were also brought in. First, ATOP’s “ASYMM” variable, a dummy 
variable describing whether the alliance established asymmetrical commitments, was 
applied. If a treaty includes asymmetrical commitments, the alliance may fall apart over a 
dispute regarding commitment levels. Second, the dummy variable “LINK” was recoded 
from ATOP’s “natrefal” variable. If the alliance was linked to or designed in conformance to 
another alliance, “LINK” was coded as “1.” Given theories of issue linkage, treaties 
associated with other commitments should be more reliable. Third, Model IV tested the 
effect of the treaty having a renunciation clause. This variable was recoded as an ordinal 
variable, with lower values representing restrictions on renouncing obligations and higher 
values representing more permissive rules on alliance renunciation. If states can easily 
(and legally) renounce their commitments, they will be more likely to do so. Finally, regime 
type, embodied in the Polity variable “DEM” was included in Model III and Model IV. This 
variable uses a scale from negative ten to ten, with higher values indicating a more 
democratic institutional structure. This variable was included because Putnam and other 
scholars have posited that democratic countries can more credibly commit and participate 
in agreements.137   
                                                        
 137 Putnam, “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics,” 449. 
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FIGURE 11: OLOGIT REGRESSION OF TREATY RATIFICATION AND ALLIANCE 
TERMINATION 
 
 Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
     
TREATY RATIFICATION 
-0.621*** 
(0.13) 
-0.847*** 
(0.15) 
-0.717*** 
(0.17) 
-0.762***  
(0.16) 
     
ASYMMETRIC 
____COMMITMENT 
0.699** 
(0.23) 
0.579* 
(0.27) 
0.397 
(0.30) 
0.333 
(0.30) 
     
WARTIME ALLIANCE -1.364*** 
(0.33) 
-1.462*** 
(0.36) 
-0.915* 
(0.38) 
-0.823*  
(0.40) 
     
SPECIFIED THREAT 0.908*** 
(0.16) 
0.435* 
(0.21) 
0.471* 
(0.21) 
0.229  
(0.20) 
     
PREVIOUS DISPUTE 0.145 
(0.32) 
0.254 
(0.39) 
0.511 
(0.43) 
0.516 
(0.53) 
     
DEMOCRATIC REGIME  -0.112*** 
(0.02) 
-0.111*** 
(0.02) 
-0.111*** 
(0.02) 
     
LINKED TREATY   -0.584** 
(0.21) 
-0.759**  
(0.23) 
     
RENUNCIATION CLAUSE    -0.573*** 
(0.13) 
     
CONSTANT CUT I 0.222 
(0.18) 
-0.216 
(0.21) 
-0.256 
(0.22) 
-0.596** 
(0.22) 
     
CONSTANT CUT II 1.398*** 
(0.19) 
1.164*** 
(0.24) 
1.195*** 
(0.25) 
0.897*** 
(0.26) 
     
CONSTANT CUT III 1.828*** 
(0.20) 
1.496*** 
(0.24) 
1.584*** 
(0.24) 
1.292*** 
(0.24) 
     
CONSTANT CUT IV 2.633*** 
(0.17) 
2.448*** 
(0.20) 
2.312*** 
(0.21) 
2.028*** 
(0.21) 
     
N 1184 976 898 898 
Robust standard errors in the parentheses 
***=p<0.01 **=p,0.05 *=p<0.01 
 
Cells report parameters estimated via clustering along Correlates of War Country Codes.  The dependent variable, alliance termination, can 
take on five values (from one to five). Negatively signed coefficients are associated with a decrease in the acrimony that brought the alliance 
to a close. See figure 10 for variable TERMIN’s breakdown. 
 
 Treaty ratification is statistically significant in the negative direction for each model 
tested. Thus, we can presume that ratified alliances are more reliable.  Asymmetric 
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commitments, too, were negative;y correlated and statistically significant in two models, 
suggesting that asymmetrical commitments tend to make treaties more reliable. Two 
explanations can be given for this: first, it may just be an accident of the data – after all, in 
Models III and IV, asymmetric commitments make treaties less reliable (although this trend 
is not statistically significant). A narrative could also be constructed that explains this 
negative correlation: asymmetric commitments may often be between a great power and a 
smaller country. In such cases, the smaller state may bandwagon with the larger state in 
such a way that both are likely to fulfill their commitments. Bandwagoning could similarly 
explain why specified threats seem to correlate with less reliable alliances – threats may 
pluck allies away, even after they’ve committed against the supposed enemy. 
 No other statistically significant variable seems to decrease alliance reliability – 
previous disputes, as theorized, make alliances less likely, but the results are not significant 
even at the 0.1 level. Meanwhile, as predicted above, alliances with more democratic 
regimes, “linked” alliances, and wartime alliances are all more reliable. One final variable 
that is remarkable in making treaties more reliable, however, is the presence of 
renunciation clauses. According Model IV, the presence of renunciation clauses make 
alliances more reliable at the .001 level. Perhaps renunciation clauses act as a sort of act of 
trust – states that construct renunciation clauses are more likely to solve policy disputes 
peaceably, as they know that worse comes to worse, they can simply leave the given 
alliance.  
 Overall, then, treaty ratification does significantly promote alliance reliability. One 
question thus remains – how powerful is the effect of ratification on alliance reliability? 
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Measuring the Effect of Ratification 
 To test the effect of ratification on reliability, two SPOST predictions were created. 
First, a prvalue was designed based on Model III, whereby all variables were kept at their 
mean besides alliance ratification.  For un-ratified alliances, 55 percent of the probability 
mass favors the treaty either being maintained or fulfilled. Similarly, the model predicts 
about a 30 percent chance the alliance is dissolved over a dispute, a 5 percent chance the 
treaty is ignored, a 6 percent chance the treaty is violated, and a 7 percent chance the 
alliance ends with inter-alliance war. Meanwhile, if the treaty is ratified, the alliance has 
about a 72 percent chance of being fulfilled. If the alliance is ratified, the chances that the 
treaty is ignored, violated, or ends in inter-alliance war all drop by about half. Although 
these latter percent changes are in truth small, that shift in probability masses may embody 
the avoidance of conflict between two great powers, hypothetically saving millions of lives 
from inter-alliance war. See figure 12 below for results. Thus, it can be seen from this 
prediction that treaty ratification has a powerful effect on alliance reliability. Ratification 
alone has the capacity to shift an alliance’s probability mass away from conflict towards the 
long-term maintenance of the agreement. 
  
FIGURE 12: PRVALUE PREDICTIONS OF RATIFICATION AND RELIABILITY
The above graph is generated using a prvalue prediction of alliance ratification and reliability. The 
given political occurrence, is calculated towards the statistical model’s variable of alliance termination, which can take on five values. Model III wa
used. All other variables are at their mean 
 
 Finally, we can conceive of the substantive significance of alliance ratification 
through a listcoef prediction. For a one “unit” increase in treaty ratification (i.e. if the treaty 
is ratified) the odds of having a more peaceable resolution of the allianc
percent.  This percentage is noticeably similar to other variables driving alliance 
For instance, for a “unit” increase in the wartime alliance variable (the alliance is a wartime 
alliance), the odds of having a more peaceable resolution of 
percent. Similar trends are prevalent
presence of a renunciation clause (43.6 percent
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FIGURE 13: LISCOEF FOR PERCENT CHANGE IN ODDS REGARDING ALLIANCE 
The above graph is generated using a listcoef prediction of independent variable’s effect on
odds for unit increase in X, is calculated towards the statistical model’s variable of alliance termination, which can take on fiv
used. All variables are dummy variables, except “renunciation clause,” which can take on three values.
“renunciation clause,” which can take on three values.
 
Conclusion 
 These results suggesting a strong relationship between alliance ratification and 
alliance reliability are tempered by the fact that they result 
example, the field has not yet constructed accurate, publically available data on ratification 
rules. “ESTMODE” acts as shallow representations of a much deeper dynamic 
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discussed in this thesis’s theory. Simultaneously, merging Weitsman and Shabaugh’s data, 
for instance, left numerous holes in the data. These holes often represented countries (The 
Kingdom of Korea) or regions (parts of Sub-Saharan Africa) that would have proven 
difficult for Weitsman and Shambaugh to gather data on. Recoding was done so that 
measures of systemic change and global power concentration could be applied to more 
cases, but more could still be done.  
 Additionally, by focusing on member-level data, this thesis surrendered the 
opportunity to engage with dyadic variables.138 This decision was based on two 
considerations. First, most of ATOP’s variables were designed for the member-level dataset 
– recoding such information into dyadic data would have proven extremely difficult. 
Second, the theory proposed by this thesis is one at the member level – relating a country’s 
domestic structures to events and structures at the international level.  Nonetheless, by 
using member-level data, certain datasets and controls were forfeited, such as data on 
dyadic rivalries of direct contiguity data. Thus, future research designs hoping to 
investigate alliance reliability or alliance structure should consider both a dyadic and 
member-level approach. 
 Overall, however, the findings suggest that treaties are more reliable when they are 
ratified. Importantly, this trend is both statistically and substantially significant. In other 
words, the theory enshrined from page one of this paper is supported, even if one of its 
intervening variables, alliance structures, returned muddled results. 
 
                                                        
 138 ATOP’s data can technically be used in six forms based on different units of analysis: member, 
alliance, alliance phase, state-year, dyad-year, and directed dyad-year. Only member-level data includes all 
ATOP’s variables regarding alliance reliability.  
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THESIS CONCLUSION 
 This thesis has asked whether states are correct when they assume ratification 
correlates with higher reliability in security affairs. In order to describe the relationship 
between alliance ratification and reliability, the thesis described three relationships: those 
between alliance ratification and alliance formation, alliance structure, and alliance 
reliability. Ratification and alliance formation are linked because as ratification structures 
become more rigorous, alliance formation becomes more restrictive. This is because as 
ratification structures become more restrictive, there will be more opportunities for the 
opposition to grow and agitate. Also, as these restrictions develop, more veto players will 
arise to block the legislative process. Meanwhile, as ratification restrictions increase, 
negotiators will construct treaties that specifically organize alliance member’s obligations 
and expectations. Negotiators, aware that a clearer alliance structure can increase the 
probability of ratification success, tailor the level of specificity at the alliance level to 
resolve concerns at the domestic level.  
 These considerations at the domestic level relate to the dynamics of alliance 
reliability through two factors. First, clearer alliances with specific structures will be more 
likely to survive changes in policymakers or ideas among member states. Second, states 
that commit via ratification will appear less dangerous, altering the balance of threat within 
and outside of the alliance.  
 To test these hypotheses, this thesis engaged in both qualitative and quantitative 
research. In addressing the relationship between alliance ratification and alliance 
formation, this study analyzed a number of states ratification of League of Nations 
membership. Two key findings stood out – first, that the failure of ratification in the United 
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States cannot be explained by a lack of popularity for the alliance – such difficulties arose 
across countries. Second, in each country (including in the U.S.), state structures drove the 
ratification process. These structures often allowed ratification to happen, but in each case 
showed how alliance formation was concocted in a unique way. Meanwhile, numerous  
regressions suggested that there existed inconclusive but noteworthy relationships 
between alliance ratification and alliance structure and reliability. Thus, overall, evidence 
towards the links between ratification, formation, structure, and reliability have been 
found, although evidence that better ties these fields together must be found at a later date. 
 There are numerous ways that this thesis’s research design should be expanded into 
future studies. First, research should expand upon the methodologies used herein. For 
example, scholars should engage with other case studies besides the League of Nations to 
test the link between ratification and alliance reliability.139 Meanwhile, in quantitative 
research, better measures of treaty ratification and alliance structure should be created, 
and research should be performed using both a member-level and dyadic approach. 
 Second, future research should consider theoretic issues that have remained as of 
yet unaddressed. For instance, does ratification have the same impact on multilateral and 
bilateral alliances? Do both countries need to ratify an agreement for the treaty to be 
effective, or just one? Do domestic audiences operate differently in response to alliance 
treaties, as compared to other sorts of treaties? 
 Finally, the implications of this study should be considered from international law 
or policy prescriptive approaches. For example, how should security agreements, such as 
the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, be conceived of and applied in international politics? In 
                                                        
 139 In particular, future qualitative research should aspire to study how authoritarian states “ratify,” 
form, and structure alliances. It should likewise analyze how authoritarian politics affect alliance reliability. 
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the coming decades, how should the United States strategically apply commitments that 
have not been ratified? As the United States slowly pivots to Asia, should new security 
agreements be constructed towards ratification, or left as loose political commitments? 
This thesis suggests that although commitments may be more difficult to establish via 
ratification, the costs may come with the benefit of reliability.  
 This thesis began with Martin’s “signal” -- an alleged gesture states grant one 
another through the ratification of security agreements. Martin suggests that states ratify 
to prove that the establish commitment was reliable. Through theoretic, qualitative, and 
quantitative reasoning, this thesis has suggested that states are acting rationally both by 
sending and receiving this signal. Ratification, therefore, does alter reliability calculations. 
Ratification and its signal, thus, are not ephemeral noises made in the hopes of garnering 
support. Instead, ratification produces its own rhythm, creating a unique tempo both in 
domestic affairs and alliance politics writ large. 
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